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Microfinance has been gaining momentum and popularity over the past 40 years. As it 
has grown, it has been at the center of a critical debate: commended by some as a practical tool 
to fight poverty and criticized by others as over-praised and under-effective, the role of 
microfinance in serving the poor and alleviating poverty is ever in question. However, what has 
failed to enter the central debate is the lack of sharia-compliant services for the Muslim poor who 
may require them. Some Muslims exclude themselves from conventional financial tools because 
charging interest is prohibited in Islam. An increase in sharia-compliant financial services could 
not only broaden access to financial tools, but play an important role in the economic 
development of Muslim-majority countries. This paper analyzes the impact of sharia compliance 
on financial sustainability indicators (financial self-sufficiency ratio and return on assets ratio) 
and outreach indicators (percent of borrowers who are female and average balance per 
borrower/GNI per capita) of 54 firms in the MENA region by employing the OLS regression 
method. The goal of this research is to determine whether Islamic MFIs are a viable alternative 
for conventional MFIs, with the hope of contributing to the discussion on whether the expansion 
of Islamic microfinance will be beneficial for serving the Muslim poor. The results of this study 
corroborate previous studies and conclude that Islamic microfinance is a practical substitute for 
conventional microfinance with comparable outcomes in financial sustainability and outreach, at 
least in the MENA region. The results and complications throughout the study further conclude 
that, as the debate around microfinance in general and Islamic microfinance specifically 
continues, a wider variety of studies related to Islamic microfinance as an alternative and its role 
in poverty alleviation overall are necessary.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Microfinance has been a movement gaining momentum and popularity since Mohammad Yunus’ 
creation of the Grameen Bank in 1983. Recently, microfinance institutions (MFIs), which help 
the poor obtain credit to advance income-generating activities, have been at the center of a 
critical debate. Commended by some as a practical tool to fight poverty and criticized by others 
to be over-praised and under-effective, microfinance is being examined for sustainability and 
impact on many levels.  
While there are many studies on the various aspects and effects of microfinance, very few 
take up the study of sharia-compliant microfinance, which has the potential to offer religiously 
suitable services to the Muslim poor who desire or require them. About one quarter of the 
world’s population are Muslim (World 2010) and a majority live in low-income countries. 
Further, these populations are expected to increase by 36.9% by 2050 (Earlbeck, Altunas, and 
Berry-Stolze 2011). 
In Islam, conventional methods of finance are unsuitable because they charge interest, 
which is forbidden under sharia financial law. This may be a contributing factor to the trend of 
Muslims using fewer financial services than non-Muslims (Mohieldin et al. 2011). An increase 
in sharia-compliant financial institutions, specifically microfinance institutions, has the potential 
to reach more of the poor and play a significant role in the economic development of many 
Muslim-majority countries. According to a World Bank study, a large number of microenterprise 
owners and low-income individuals interviewed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
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would prefer sharia-compliant financial products. Over 60% of those interviewed in the West 
Bank and Gaza would prefer Islamic products, even at a higher price. 32% of Jordanians 
interviewed cite religion as a reason for not obtaining a loan, with 18.6% ranking religious 
reasons as number one. An estimated 40% of poor Yemenis demand Islamic financial services, 
even if it is more expensive. In Syria, 43% consider religious reasons as the largest obstacle to 
microcredit. Finally, in Indonesia, 49% of those interviewed consider interest prohibited and 
would prefer sharia-compliant institutions (Mohieldin et al. 2011). This demand underscores the 
need for greater examination of the benefits of offering sharia-compliant financial services to an 
underserved and in-need population and the impact that this might have on overall poverty, 
women, and the wellbeing of families.  
This paper examines the impact of sharia compliance on four outreach and financial 
sustainability indicators of MFIs in the MENA region and explores whether Islamic 
microfinance is a viable alternative for conventional microfinance. It analyzes the effect of being 
a sharia-compliant firm with the goal of discovering whether Islamic MFIs are as financially 
sustainable as conventional MFIs and if they perform competitively in outreach to in-need 
communities. The effect of sharia-compliance will be tested through running OLS regressions on 
the four indicators. The financial self-sufficiently and return on assets ratios are used to indicate 
financial sustainability, while the percentage of borrowers who are female and average balance 
per borrower/GNI per capita are used to indicate outreach to in-need borrowers. The hypothesis, 
which is largely confirmed by the results for the MENA region, is that there is not a significant 
difference between Islamic and conventional MFIs in financial sustainability and outreach to the 
poor. The implications of this conclusion include that an expansion of Islamic microfinance 
could benefit the Muslim poor in the MENA region through increasing access to financial 
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services without compromising measures of financial sustainability and outreach. An increase in 
Islamic microfinance goes beyond the scope of the many individuals that would gain access to 
financial services and could benefit countrywide economies and the global economy at large.  
The first section of this paper provides a detailed overview of microfinance and its 
surrounding debates as it grows in the global economy as a method of addressing poverty. The 
second section explains Islamic finance and microfinance, covering its technicalities and 
differences from conventional microfinance. This section will also address the challenges and 
debates surrounding Islamic microfinance as they contribute to the future of microfinance and 
the Islamic version as a viable alternative. The third section presents findings from previous 
studies and how their conclusions relate to the questions that this paper seeks to answer. The 
fourth section provides a detailed description of the model being used and the data from which 
this paper’s conclusions will be drawn. The fifth section presents the results of the regressions 
and discusses their implications. The final section offers conclusions drawn from this study, a 
discussion of the limitations and complications of this study, and recommendations for further 
exploration of the topic 
. 
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2.0 An Introduction to Microfinance 
Microfinance became famous in the 1970s with the advent of Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen 
Bank. Yunus saw how little access to finance people had and began a lending experiment to 
people in a village near Chittagong University in Bangladesh. The small loans helped the 
businesses of the villagers and, despite having little to offer in collateral, repayments remained 
high. After successfully trying these small loans in a different part of the country, he founded 
Grameen Bank and revolutionized the group-lending model (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
Yunus’ model highlighted the need for innovative solutions like microfinance to provide 
financial services to the poor. His version and the adaptations that followed address some of the 
underlying problems concerning the poor and financial markets, including information 
asymmetries, discrimination, and the complications that arose from subsidized state-run banks. 
Financial markets are intended to fix asymmetries, but do not always work efficiently, 
which can lead to costly consequences (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008). Among these is 
inequality in access to financial services, which can highly impact the poor. Traditionally, 
moneylenders would lend to the poor rather than formal financial institutions and would charge 
high rates, have monopoly power, and have the ability to keep people in a cycle of debt 
(Armendariz and Morduch 2005). This happens because the poor are risky. They do not have 
collateral and often do not work in the formal market, and thus cannot borrow against future 
income. Small transactions are also costly to institutions, especially when information on 
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borrowers and collateral are absent. This is compounded by the necessity of a high volume of 
transactions due to the small absolute value of profit (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008). 
Traditional banks have typically stayed out of small transactions because information 
asymmetries and the cost associated with enforcing contracts make it difficult to glean profits 
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2006). For such reasons, government-subsidized banks 
were tasked with serving the poor, typically focusing on farming communities. State banks, 
however, proved problematic due to their political associations. They would often charge interest 
rates well below the market rate, did not pursue repayment efficiently (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Morduch 2008), and would tend to forgive loans before elections (Armendariz and Morduch, 
2005). Further, they distorted the market rationing mechanism which, theoretically, leads to 
those with the most worthy projects being willing to pay the market rate (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005). 
Even though state banks turned out to be inefficient and costly, the idea of diminishing 
returns to capital still applies: capital should be going to poor entrepreneurs who can reap high 
returns and pay high interest rates to cover their risk (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). However, 
this has not happened, which leads to the need for an alternative approach such as microfinance. 
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2.1 The Need for Microfinance 
Discrimination is a reality in financial markets. Most scholars agree that increasing access is not 
only beneficial for the individual, but for the overall economy as well. Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 
(2008) find that “lack of access to finance [is] a critical mechanism for generating persistent 
income inequality, as well as slower growth” (ix). Imperfections in the market will affect the 
talented poor who lack collateral, credit history, and connections (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 
2008). If these imperfections aren’t addressed, unequal access may be perpetual. Microfinance 
seeks to correct some of these asymmetries and problems. One major information asymmetry is 
limited liability, which, in the case of serving the poor, is the lack of collateral that causes banks 
to not do business with poor customers. Adverse selection is another common information 
asymmetry, which is when banks lack information against risky borrowers and cannot 
discriminate against them, leading to high interest rates. Moral hazard, which has two main 
forms, is a third major information asymmetry and generally relates to the failure to safeguard 
against risk because protection is guaranteed. Ex ante moral hazard comprises unobservable 
actions taken by the borrower after the loan has been received but before returns are realized, 
while ex post moral hazard is the possibility that the borrower invests the money but does not 
pay back the loan when returns are realized. These problems are compounded by the nature of 
serving poor and rural communities and led to the need for a new way to distribute loans and 
increase access to financial services while reducing transaction costs (Armendáriz and Morduch 
2005).  
 Microfinance has come a long way since its beginnings with Grameen Bank and has 
transformed to meet the specific needs of the diverse communities that MFIs serve. Microfinance 
began with the group lending approach, in which groups are comprised of voluntary members 
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who insure each other’s repayments and face collective penalties if default occurs. Lending to 
individuals has grown in practice and, despite breaking away from group loans, new forms of 
microfinance contracts have managed to maintain high repayment rates of over 95% (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2006). While it cannot be a panacea for poverty on its own, 
microfinance can expand the poor’s ability to smooth consumption and deal with emergencies 
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2008). These different manifestations of microfinance have 
a variety of mechanisms in place to address information asymmetries and ensure repayment, 
including the institution’s lending method and structure, innovative repayment incentives and 
solutions for covering risk, incorporating savings, and a focus on gender. 
2.2 Group Versus Individual Lending 
Many MFIs, even Grameen Bank, have strayed from the group-lending model and have begun 
lending to individuals. Both structures face higher costs when serving poorer clients, but present 
different benefits and drawbacks to both the bank and clients.  
In group lending, groups, often self-formed, assume joint liability for repayment. This 
reduces limited liability, moral hazard, and adverse selection because the bank capitalizes on 
local information while decreasing the costs of conducting due diligence on clients and enforcing 
contracts, thus allowing for lower interest rates (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Research done 
by Gine et al. (2006) also shows that dynamic incentives, joint liability, peer monitoring, and 
self-selection increase repayment in group lending. In addition to improving repayment through 
peer pressure, group-lending mechanisms offer channels for support and education. Because 
group members often live and work together, they can impose both social and economic 
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sanctions in a way that the bank cannot when restrained by the absence of collateral and weak 
legal enforcement (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). The group-lending model has shown how 
creative contracts can work where conventional ones have not.  
 There are a number of problems that arise in the group lending model, which are 
sometimes contradictory to what other research has claimed as a benefit. While many supporters 
of group lending argue that the structure reduces risk to the institution by having group members 
insure each other, high communication among members is found in experiments done by Gine et 
al. (2006) to increase collusion among group members, which can lead to a greater risk of moral 
hazard. For example, if the members of the group all agree not to repay, all members are better 
off, the threat of social sanction diminishes, and the bank bears the cost. In addition to collusion, 
groups can spawn free riding problems in the same way that has been exhibited by abuse of 
public goods and tragedy of the commons (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2006). Further, if 
some members do not repay, this is a disincentive for remaining members to repay, as, due to the 
structure of most group loans, they have already lost their prospects for securing future loans 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008). Montgomery (1996) finds that group lending can lead to 
disciplining borrowers in ways that are “unnecessarily exclusionary,” such as barring defaulters 
from day-to-day activities and social and religious events and can diminish the social aims of the 
MFI. However, Karlan (2007) finds that while groups are more likely to punish defaulters, they 
are also more likely to forgive debt, implying a distinction between default and bad luck, which 
could mitigate concerns of excessive social sanctions. 
Individually based loans have a number of different characteristics than group-based 
loans. They are often larger and associated with the wealthier poor. They have also been more 
successful in areas with deeper social divisions, sparse populations, high costs of peer 
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monitoring, and limited effectiveness of social sanctions (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
Additionally, research done by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduh (2006) suggests that 
individually based loans can be beneficial for customers that are willing to invest in larger 
ventures and for whom group-lending becomes a burden. Financially, lending to individuals is 
typically associated with higher average profit levels and has been a good option for MFIs that 
choose to become commercial entities (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008). These firms have also 
been able to maintain high repayment rates through options like repaying in public, being barred 
from future access if they default, and dynamic incentives upon successful repayment.  
 Unique difficulties have also developed for MFIs offering individually based loans. For 
example, in big cities where there is often an inclination towards these loans, social sanctions can 
be less effective because community relationships often aren’t as strong. Mission drift, the 
tendency to move away from serving the poorest customers, is also common for MFIs offering 
individual loans. While not necessarily a negative change, it does mean a shift in the social 
mission of the MFI and can lead to the poorest of the poor remaining without financial access. 
Finally, outreach indicators for MFIs offering individual loans tend to be lower than those 
offering group loans (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2006). Neither group nor individual 
loaning schemes can be said to be definitively better or more effective, but should be considered 
based on the needs of the individual community in which the MFI is operating. 
2.3 Organizational Structures 
Microfinance institutions typically take on one of three institutional structures: non-bank 
financial institutions (NBFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and commercial banks. 
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This overview will deal NGOs and commercial banks, as NBFIs take on many different forms 
and cannot typically be generalized.   
NGOs are more likely to be non-profits and tend to offer smaller loans. For example, 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009) find on average that loans from NGOs are less than a 
quarter of the size of those offered by commercial microfinance banks, which indicates that 
NGOs typically have better outreach to the poor. Conversely, commercialized microfinance 
banks are more likely to be for-profit institutions, provide larger loans, and loan to fewer women, 
but achieve higher profitability and are able to function at lower costs per dollar lent because of 
their increased size (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2008).  
 A large benefit of operating as a NGO is that they do not experience mission drift as 
often as commercialized microfinance banks. Even though they tend to remain more committed 
to serving the poorest borrowers, NGOs remain among the leading MFIs and serve more 
borrowers overall and a greater number of borrowers at profit. Mission drift still exists for 
NGOs, but Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009) explain that this is not necessarily bad 
because serving more profitable customers can lead to reaching a larger absolute number of poor 
customers through internal cross-subsidization and scale economies. Many studies argue that 
increasing access to financial services is good for the overall economy, thus increasing access to 
any underserved population is still beneficial to society and the larger economy.   
 Subsidy dependence is the most-cited pitfall of the NGO structure and leads to the 
argument that non-commercialized microfinance is unsustainable (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 
2008). However, Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2008) find that conclusion to be limited 
due to disregarding the ability of MFIs to shift strategies and optimize resources in the face of 
decreasing or eliminated subsidization. Further, studies analyzed in Armendáriz and Morduch 
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(2005) conclude that even when the cost of subsidization is factored in, microfinance remains a 
positive social investment. At the bottom line, however, most NGO-structured MFIs are likely 
too small to reach scales large enough to be sustainable (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008).  
In addition to subsidy dependence, NGOs must charge the highest interest rates because 
they make the smallest loans to the poorest customers, which entail high unit costs. However, 
contrary to this logic, there are a number of examples of MFIs that charge much higher rates 
after commercialization because of their commitments to profitability and shareholders. One 
prominent example is Banco Compartamos in Latin America, which commercialized and saw 
impressive returns and rapid expansion, but also increased interest rates to over 100% per year 
when inflation was only 4% (Armendariz and Morduch 2005).  
2.4 Mitigating Risk 
The risks associated with serving lower-income customers, information asymmetries, and the 
weak legal systems that characterize low-income countries have combined with the evolution of 
the microfinance industry and resulted in a variety of creative ways to incentivize repayment and 
mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Many mechanisms exist that aim to reduce these 
risks, but the most widespread are higher interest rates, flexible and financial collateral, dynamic 
incentives, frequent installments, public repayment, and cross reporting.  
 High costs of monitoring, lack of collateral, and greater risk of default contribute to high 
interest rates present in microfinance. While skeptics criticize these rates as being excessive, 
supporters of microfinance argue that, in addition to simply reflecting the cost of doing business, 
clients have the ability to pay high rates because of their high marginal returns to capital 
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(Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 2008). At high rates, however, Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch, 
(2006) find that there are instances of only low-quality borrowers being willing to take loans, 
which runs counter to the argument presented earlier that rates weed out low-quality projects, 
leaving the analysis on rates inconclusive.  
To incentivize repayment, some MFIs have innovatively reintroduced collateral, which 
the poor typically cannot offer. Using assets of notional or abstract value in place of those with 
resale value can give the MFI more leverage and improve repayment (Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck 
2008). BRI of Indonesia has had success with this and accepts any item of personal value as 
collateral (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Many institutions have also incorporated financial 
collateral by requiring borrowers to prove that they can save regularly before obtaining a loan or 
requiring savings alongside loans. For example, Grameen Bank requires all clients to deposit a 
portion of the loan that they can only withdraw when they leave the program. In addition to 
serving as financial collateral, savings can help borrowers accumulate money for investment, 
retirement, and unexpected expenses. Requiring savings, however, is criticized for diminishing 
the essential and limited personal capital available to clients (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
 Dynamic incentives have had success in reducing moral hazard in both group and 
individual liability contracts. These include exclusion from obtaining a loan in the future as 
punishment for default and the opportunity to obtain larger loans in the future as reward for 
repayment (Gine, et al. 2006). However, if the market is highly competitive and data sharing 
resources are insufficient, bad borrowers can exploit the system, decreasing the effectiveness of 
dynamic incentives. Such loopholes have led to solutions such as requiring a guarantor, officer 
visits to homes to evaluate the borrower’s character, and improving cross reporting among 
lenders (Armendariz and Morduch 2005).  
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 Requiring small, frequent repayment installments is another technique that has kept 
repayment high for both group and individual liability loans. Frequent installments can also have 
the added benefit of serving as an early warning sign for default. However, some critics argue 
that small, frequent installments can be illogical and counterproductive if the investment has not 
had time to become profitable or if the borrower is engaged in a seasonal activity (Armendariz 
and Morduch 2005).  
Public repayment increases the threat of social sanctions, thereby encouraging timely 
repayment. This method has been widely used by MFIs and is still employed by Grameen Bank 
for both group and individual loans. Even when liability is individual, group meetings and public 
repayments have kept repayment rates high through the inherent threat of the community 
knowing about and punishing defaulters. Further, when repayments are done in public groups, 
collection costs decrease for the MFI. For both group and individual liability loans, requiring 
public group repayment can provide the MFI with more information about the borrowers, as 
group members can be good sources of information about each other, and create opportunities to 
offer education and training to the group as a whole (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
2.5 Women and Microfinance 
Gender is an integral topic to any discussion on microfinance. Many scholars and practitioners 
see targeting women as a factor for success and a measure of achieving social goals (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Beck 2008). For example, Grameen Bank grew from an initial 44% female client base 
to 95%, a bias that has continued due to women’s better repayment records compared to men 
(Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Many scholars also cite women as being more reliable 
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customers and less prone to moral hazard (Gine, et al. 2006). Further, micro businesses often 
operate in the informal sector, of which women make up a large and growing part. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) point out that women are less mobile, which makes contract 
enforcement and monitoring easier. Less mobility also increases the impact of social sanctions, 
leading to women making less risky investments. They also show women to be biased in favor of 
public goods that benefit the family or community. When women have control over money, they 
spend more on household expenditures like healthcare and education relative to men. For 
example, Thomas (1990) shows that the health of children in Brazil improves when women 
control non-labor income. In a subsequent study in Brazil, Thomas (1994) finds that an increase 
in women’s bargaining power is positively correlated with health spending. Receiving a loan can 
also increase the opportunity cost of a woman’s time, which can have a negative effect on the 
fertility rate and a positive effect on using contraception (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
A major criticism of microfinance and its focus on women is that women who receive 
loans do not actually control the money. A study from Goetz, and Sen Gupta (1996) shows that 
40% of women in the study had little to no control over their investment activity. Rankin (2002) 
further criticizes that women are often pushed into industries like “sweater knitting” that allow 
them to remain secluded. Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) analyze a number of studies and find 
a pattern indicating that focusing on women perpetuates their reliance on male family because 
they lack access to the right inputs and facilities. They also find patterns of increased violence 
against women as a result of microfinance. For example, Rahman (1999) finds that 70% of 
female borrowers in one village experienced an increase in violence as a result of their 
involvement. Rahman theorizes that violence increases because of tensions men feel as their 
traditional role is threatened in patriarchal societies. Armendáriz and Rome (2008) also point to 
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this possibility, but state that mixed groups can mitigate this and can eradicate any uncertainty 
about what women are being loaned, which men often overestimate and then force their wives to 
divert to household needs. 
Banerjee et al. (2014) evaluate the effects of borrowing after two end line results from a 
randomized evaluation of a group lending microfinance program in Hyderabad, India. They find 
no effect on women’s empowerment1 after 18 to 36 months and that 70% of women still prefer 
borrowing from other sources. Contrary to other studies, they find no change in the probability 
that children and teenagers are enrolled in school. While the study indicates no positive effect of 
microfinance on women’s empowerment or school enrollment of children and teens, it deals only 
with a for-profit MFI in one Indian city, so the evaluation should be replicated across different 
institutions and areas. Despite contradicting studies, focusing on women is still widely practiced 
and seen as a positive indicator of outreach for MFIs. 
2.6 The Future of Microfinance 
Banerjee et al. (2014) concludes that microfinance is not for everyone and that the vast majority 
of microbusiness owners do not experience “miraculous transformations” in their profits or lives. 
Despite conflicting studies yielding inconclusive results for most of the debated topics about 
microfinance, the principle that increasing access to financial services is good for the overall 
economy has held. Many critics have shown that microfinance has been successful in some 
contexts and applications and that it has the potential to increase incomes, allow 
1 The study measures women’s empowerment by testing for differences in children’s education (school, enrollment, attendance, and private schooling) and children’s labor supply. These metrics are chosen because when women have more choice over how household funds are spent, they tend to spend in ways that benefit their children’s education and health.  
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microentrepreneurs to invest in their businesses, and alleviate poverty. The growth of 
microfinance has resulted in many variations on the original model. However, further 
innovations and improvements are essential as the industry continues to grow and serve a wider 
variety of customers. Islamic microfinance has come about as one of these variations and offers 
different products and institutional structures in addition to religious adherence that may better 
serve the needs of some of the world’s poor. 
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3.0 Overview of Islamic Finance and Microfinance 
With roots dating back to Cairo in 1963, Islamic finance is where law and economics meets 
religion and politics (Bianchi 2007)—an economic system that works towards attaining the dual 
goals of religious piety and profit maximization (Robbins 2010). Since its modern inception, the 
industry has grown to a size of around 1.6 trillion US dollars (Global 2013) and is expected to 
continue growing around 10-15% annually (Freudenberg and Nathie 2012), making it an 
increasingly important player in the global financial system. In its ideal form, the Islamic 
financial system (IFS) is based on ethical rules with a moral purpose rather than pure capitalism. 
Several aspects of the secular financial system, such as interest-based loans, are prohibited under 
Islamic financial law, creating the demand for an alternative financial system. The demand for 
this system can be seen in its rising popularity that is reflected in the Islamic microfinance 
industry as well, with growth in clients exceeding 1.2 million borrowers (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 
2013).  
 Among the most prominent differences of the IFS is the prohibition of interest and 
excessive uncertainty or speculation. The IFS employs products designed to avoid these 
characteristics and strives to create an alternative financial system that reconciles religious 
principles with the modern global economy. However, critics point out that interest is effectively 
taken by a different name (i.e. markups) and is still used to benchmark the time value of money 
(Asutay 2012). In theory, the system should be grounded in asset accumulation rather than cash 
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accumulation and is intended to reinforce the principle of money as a means of exchange and 
store of value rather than a commodity with intrinsic value. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) 
should also not generate unjustified income through lending (Hourani 2004). In place of 
conventional loans, the ideal framework in the IFS for financing is profit sharing and 
partnerships. In practice, however, tools are largely a product of financial engineering that allows 
sharia-compliant products to serve the same purposes as their commercial counterparts, thus 
adhering to the formal technicalities of Islamic financial law while largely avoiding complying 
with the spirit and purpose of the system. This same phenomenon is present in Islamic 
microfinance. Critics such as Hamoudi (2007) explain that the IFS is more formal than 
functional in nature. In reality, it has mechanisms that effectively act as interest, and financing 
through profit and loss-sharing mechanisms makes up a miniscule part of the system [less than 
10% according to Asutay (2008)]. Instead, there is a heavy reliance on financial engineering that 
does not prevent the commodification of money. IfIs also tend to avoid industries that deal in 
gambling, pornography, alcohol, tobacco, pork, and media products like gossip magazines 
(Robbins 2010). A final prominent difference of IFIs is the support and maintenance of a sharia 
board, which provides guidance to the company’s leadership on matters of sharia compliance.   
Islamic microfinance, more than enshrining the same sharia-compliant principles, is 
relevant to the Islamic banking industry because the ideal Islamic economic system places 
greater social welfare and religious responsibilities on institutions and individuals. These include 
commitments to promoting social justice, income equality, and economic development (Dusuki 
2008). For example, as social protection and justice is among the major goals of the system, the 
practice of requiring only 1% of the outstanding installment to be returned in the fact of default 
can diminish the threat of a free-fall into indebtedness (International 2012). However, this 
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practice is a recommendation and is not required. The Islamic economic system also strives for a 
standard of living for all that encompasses each being able to satisfy his basic needs (Atia 2011). 
Therefore, sharia-compliant microfinance activities further the social commitments of the system 
through promoting financial services for the poor (Dusuki 2008).  
In principle, the IFS is intended to encourage wealth creation through equal access to 
participation in income-generating activities for all social classes. Islamic microfinance 
institutions (IMFIs) can facilitate this goal by investing in and sharing risk with microenterprises 
(El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013). However, El-Zoghbi and Tarazi (2013) show that profit-and-loss 
sharing contracts make up only 6% of the portfolios surveyed. Additionally, according to the 
International Fund for Agriculture Development (2012), IMFIs offer terms and conditions that 
are often more favorable for the most vulnerable groups due to their risk sharing and 
minimization of uncertainty. If this is true in practice, IMFIs can help further the aim of greater 
social welfare. However, despite the strong support that the ideal Islamic economic system 
shows for Islamic microfinance, there has not been strong development of sharia-compliant 
institutions that serve the poorer segments of society. Instead, contemporary Islamic finance has, 
for the most part, stayed out of microfinance (Ahmed 2007). Further, Asutay (2012), points out 
that CSR in general in the IFS has been poor. He claims that IFIs have largely failed to engage in 
social and sustainable development, which he explains as essential to the Islamic moral economy 
that Islamic finance is intended to support. 
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3.1 Differences in Islamic Microfinance 
Islamic microfinance addresses the same issues as conventional microfinance: information 
asymmetries, inequality and discrimination in financial markets, lack of collateral, and high costs 
of doing business. Islamic microfinance goes a step further by providing services for borrowers 
who are unwilling to participate in interest-based financing or who would prefer a sharia-
compliant alternative. This outreach may be essential to addressing these needs even if the 
system in practice is more of a formal than functional alternative, as a number of critics claim.  
Islamic microfinance exhibits several other important characteristics that differentiate it 
from conventional microfinance. These generally, but do not have to, include financial support 
from Islamic charities, focus on the family unit, religious incentives, spousal guarantees, and the 
inclusion of religious development programs (Abdelkader and Salem 2013). Below, Table 1 
outlines the major theoretical and practical differences that might arise between the two systems: 
Table 1: Comparison between Conventional and Islamic Microfinance Institutions 
 
 
  
Items Conventional MFI Islamic MFI 
Liabilities (Source of Fund)  External Funds, Saving of client  
External Funds, Saving of Clients, 
Islamic Charitable Sources (Zakat, Waqf)  
Assets (Mode of Financing)  Interest-Based   Islamic Financial Instrument  
Funds Transfer  Cash Given  
 
Goods Transferred  
  
Deduction at Inception of 
Contract  
Part of Funds deducted as 
Inception  No deduction at Inception  
Target Group  Women   Family  
Work incentive of 
employees  Monetary  
 
Monetary and Religious  
  
Dealing with default  Group/center pressure and threat  
Group center, Spouse Guarantee and 
Islamic Ethic  
Social Development 
Program  
Secular, behavioral, ethical 
and social development  
 
Religious (includes behavior, ethics and 
social)  
Source: Ahmed (2002) 
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3.2 Size and Scope 
The Islamic financial industry has grown tremendously over the past few decades, with Islamic 
bonds emerging to capture the biggest share of the market (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). A variety of 
other products are available as well, many of which have been adapted for the micro scale. A 
description of those most pertinent to this study can be found in a later section. The size of the 
Islamic microfinance industry, while still small in comparison to conventional microfinance, has 
also seen impressive growth. Prior to 2013, there was a four-fold increase in the number of 
clients, estimated at 1.28 million, and a doubling in financial service providers, reaching over 
250 institutions. However, despite this growth, Islamic microfinance accounts for less than 1% of 
total microfinance outreach (Abdelkader and Salem 2013).  
Islamic microfinance has spread throughout the various regions of the world and is present 
in most Muslim-majority developing countries. As seen in figure 1, East Asia and the Pacific 
together have the largest number of institutions and are followed by the MENA and South Asia, 
respectively. The presence of Islamic microfinance is least prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Europe and Central Asia (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). However, as indicated by El-Zoghbi and 
Tarazi (2013), as of 2013 there were only 255 institutions and 64% were in East Asia and the 
Pacific, suggesting that the sector is dominated by a small number of providers concentrated in 
several countries.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of IMFIs by Region 
Source: El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013, 2). 
 
3.3 Sharia Law, Regulation, and Sharia Boards 
The regulations for Islamic finance and microfinance come from sharia law, which is based on 
the Quran, the sunnah or hadith, the qiyas, and ijma. Sunnah and hadith are often used 
synonymously and refer to the recordings of the prophet’s actions and words (Ma’sum Billah 
2007). Qiyas are clarifications and analogies of the hadith that make them applicable to current 
conditions, and ijma is the consensus of jurists (Robbins 2010). Hamoudi (2007 & 2008) clarifies 
the Islamic legal-financial system in practice. He explains that the majority of laws regarding the 
basis of Islamic finance come from interpretations made by jurists before the emergence of the 
modern financial system, and that the system is based largely on formalities and functionally 
irrelevant differences.  
There are a number of bodies that oversee the system, interpret sharia, make 
recommendations, issue fatwas, and offer guidance. However, these institutions are young, 
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38
1.2 4.7 1.6East Asia andPacific MENA Europe andCentral Asia South Asia Sub-SaharanAfrica
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f I
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
s
Percentage of Institutions by 
Region
 22 
developing, and sometimes do not agree on interpretations and compliance. They are also 
international organizations and produce only guidelines, not binding laws (Robbins 2010). These 
bodies, while all aiming to create a more cohesive Islamic financial system, claim to serve 
slightly different purposes, leaving the absence of one cohesive, comprehensive authority. For 
example, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions sets 
accounting, auditing, governance, ethics, and sharia standards for IFIs. The Islamic Financial 
Services Board likewise aims to set industry-wide standards, but also works towards enhancing 
the soundness and stability of IFIs. Outside of setting standards, institutions like the Islamic 
International Rating Agency provide quality and sharia compliance ratings for a variety of 
financial instruments and products. To address developing issues, the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy studies contemporary problems in the financial industry and offers new solutions that 
comply with authentic interpretations of sharia law (Robbins 2010). 
On an individual level, sharia boards are also responsible for reviewing the compliance of 
the IMFI’s operations, products, and transactions. Sharia boards can become involved on levels 
ranging from working closely with management in the firm’s operations to being consulted on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis. The board typically arrives at decisions by consensus. When the 
scholars reach consensus the board issues a fatwa (pronouncement) verifying that the transaction 
is compliant (Basu et al. 2009). The approval process varies among IMFIs and can include hiring 
an organization for sharia certification, government supervision, supervision by a local religious 
council or mosque committee, employing an external sharia board/advisor, and employing an 
internal sharia board/advisor (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). Both ordinary and microfinance 
institutions face a shortage of sharia scholars, who are few in number and stretched thin advising 
the growing number of IFIs worldwide (Basu et al. 2009).   
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3.4 Funding IMFIs 
The funding structure of IMFIs has the potential to differ significantly from that of conventional 
MFIs. In addition to employing the typical mix of donations, income from assets, and returns on 
loans to finance their operations and financial products, IMFIs have the opportunity to draw on 
charitable resources unique to Islam such as zakat, sadaqa, and waqf.  
Zakat is among the more prominent features of the Islamic economic system. It is the 
third pillar of Islam and is similar to alms. Muslims who are able to must pay zakat equivalent to 
2.5% of their net worth after meeting their needs. It is most often given to the poor through a 
mosque or an Islamic NGO. Recipients are typically the poor, the needy, the administrators of 
zakat funds, recent or potential converts, those in need of being freed from bondage, 
overburdened debtors, and travellers returning home (though these interpretations are changing). 
A significant number of Ulama argue for opening up the interpretation of recipients. Even the 
Grand Mufti and Sheikhs from Al-Azhar, the premier center for Sunni learning in the Islamic 
world, have issued fatwas for opening the interpretation (Atia 2011). Zakat is important in 
Islamic society as it is intended for treating poverty and can be used as a tool for ensuring more 
equitable wealth distribution, achieving social stability, purifying wealth, and discouraging 
hoarding (Atia 2011). One prominent use of zakat in Islamic microfinance is for consumption 
purposes to avoid loan and asset diversion (Ahmed 2004). However, zakat can also be used to 
build assets and for other productive purposes that supplement IMFI funds. These uses, with 
direct use for consumption, have the potential to decrease diversion and default and increase the 
performance of IMFIs (Ahmed 2007).  
Sadaqa, or benevolence, is a broader form of Islamic charity, which includes, in addition 
to zakat, qard al-hassan (interest free loans) and sadaqa jariya (sustainable giving). Sadaqa is an 
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act of devotion that purifies the giver and his money, like zakat. Unlike zakat, sadaqa is not 
mandatory, but rather is a voluntary charity with the same social and economic aims as zakat, but 
without restrictions on recipients. In Islamic microfinance, it is used to fund microenterprises and 
finance the operations of the IMFI (Atia 2011).  
Waqf is similar to an endowment and has several manifestations. In Islamic finance, 
money can be made into a waqf and used for interest-free loans to the beneficiaries or can be 
invested and its return given to the beneficiaries. A waqf typically involves an asset that has the 
feature of perpetuity. It can range from building a mosque or a home to digging a canal so that 
the gift continues to benefit people. The objective of a waqf can vary widely—providing 
religious services, working towards social-economic relief, education, science, or other 
objectives. One use could be establishing a nonprofit financial institution like an IMFI or qard al-
hassan bank. The returns from the waqf can be further used to complement sadaqa to finance 
microenterprises (Ahmed 2007).  
Habib Ahmed gives an example of how a waqf-based MFI is structured:  
Table 2: Balance Sheet of a Waqf-based Islamic MFI 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash (C) Savings Deposits (D) 
Assets (A)  Qard AlHassan Deposits (Q) 
  - Low-risk assets (F) Waqf Certificates (S) 
  - Microfinancing (M) Takaful Reserves (T) 
      -Loans- Qard AlHassan (Q) Profit Equalizing Reserves (P) 
      - Investments (I) Reserves / Economic Capital (V) 
          [Murabah, ijarah, salam,             
istisna, mudarabah, musharakah] 
Capital-waqf (W)  
     Source: Ahmed (2007) 
 
Ahmed (2007) describes the functioning of a waqf-based IMFI as follows: A cash 
endowment, the waqf, is the capital of the MFI and can generate more funds by issuing 
certificates. The IMFI brings in deposits taking the form mudarabah (passive partnership) 
through the provision of sharia-compliant savings. Since reserves are necessary to insure against 
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risk, the IMFI can offer takaful, a form of sharia-compliant insurance, to its borrowers, which 
builds reserves through collecting weekly or monthly insurance payments made by the 
beneficiaries. These takaful reserves would be used to help beneficiaries who are unable to make 
payments on time due to unexpected problems. A profit-equalizing reserve could be created to 
further reduce risk through taking a small share of profits during lucrative periods and later using 
these to increase payments made to savings account holders during slower periods. The IMFI 
would also build up a surplus reserve to cushion against shocks. In addition to the firm’s 
microfinancing activities such as investments and qard al-hassan loans, the IMFI would generate 
revenue through low-risk, fixed-income assets. Deposits and waqf can be used to fund 
investments, whereas qard al-hassan loans are financed only by waqf funds. As the corpus of the 
waqf must remain in tact, careful risk management is essential. Takaful can cover some losses, 
but increasing reserves can reduce the IMFI’s need to finance defaults with returns from the low-
income assets, which should instead be used to maintain the waqf.  
Ahmed (2007) summarizes that a large amount of the waqf can be used for microfinance 
if takaful reserves are high. While reserves accumulate, IMFIs can use the waqf to invest in low 
risk assets and move to using more of the waqf for microfinancing over time. To protect against 
risk, the IMFI uses takaful and profit equalization reserves. 
3.5 Islamic Financial Products 
IMFIs use a variety of contracts that allow them to provide financing through sharia-compliant 
alternatives to interest-bearing loans. The intention is for these products to be more equitable and 
less risky for the borrower than standard interest rates. The borrower is supposed to hold more 
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power than in conventional finance. For that reason, some scholars assume that this will lead to 
borrowers feeling a stronger obligation towards the terms of the loan and being more dedicated 
to repayment when their project earns profit (El-Komi, Mohamed, and Croson 2013).  
3.5.1 Qard Al-Hassan 
Qard al-hassan, which means benevolent loan, is simply a loan that does not involve interest, but 
may involve a fixed fee or markup for use of the funds (Robbins 2010). Qard al-hassan loans are 
the only permissible monetary loans and are traditionally distributed as charity, rather than as 
part of a business (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). IMFIs have begun to change this, bridging the 
tradition of qard al-hassan with modern microfinance (Atia 2011). They are one of the easiest 
options to administer, but do not always cover administrative costs and are usually forgiven in 
the case of default. As of 2013, qard al-hassan had the second largest outreach among Islamic 
microfinance products, reaching an estimated 191,000 clients (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). 
3.5.2 Mudarabah 
Mudarabah, best described as a passive partnership, is a profit sharing contract between an IFI or 
an investor and an entrepreneur. The parties determine a ratio of the profit and loss to be shared 
that is agreed upon when the contract is signed (Robbins 2010). In the agreement, one partner, 
the rab-al-mal, provides the capital, while the other, the mudarib, manages the investment 
(Hourani 2004). Ideally, if the rab-al-amal provides all of the capital, he usually bears all 
financial losses, whereas the mudarib bears the opportunity cost of his time and labor, unless the 
losses are due to the mudarib’s negligence (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). Additionally, the mudarib can 
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buy out the rab-al-mal’s investment (Hourani 2004). While this method fits the principles of 
Islamic finance well, it is not common in practice. Close monitoring is necessary for such an 
investment, which means it entails high costs that neither regular nor micro institutions are likely 
willing to bear. Savings products can also be in the form of mudarabah, with savers depositing 
money in the institution, which invests the money in sharia-compliant enterprises with which it 
shares profits and losses (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013).  
3.5.3 Musharakah 
Musharakah, or joint venture financing, is an arrangement in which each partner in the 
agreement has equal authority over the venture, even when invested capital is not equal (Robbins 
2010). It is similar to mudarabah, but both partners are entitled to be active participants in 
managing and endowing the venture or investment. Profits and losses are shared at an agreed 
upon ratio at the time the contract is signed. Profits and losses are usually shared taking into 
consideration the capital provided and the labor involved in management (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). 
Musharakah is not very common in practice for the same reasons as mudarabah.  
Diminishing musharakah is a variation of musharakah in which the capital provider and 
the payee enter a musharakah agreement to own an asset, but the provider sells his investment to 
the payee at a predetermined price and time frame (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). It is most commonly 
used to finance high-value assets like homes or ventures (Sadique 2008). Partnership and 
participation in this form means that the bank must monitor the venture, though this can create 
costs that deter banks from engaging in this type of contract.  
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3.5.4 Murabahah 
Murabahah has many variations and is the most widely used product in both normal and micro 
Islamic finance. In microfinance in particular, IMFIs lend approximately $413 million through 
murabahah to an estimated 672,000 customers (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). At its core is an 
arrangement in which an IFI buys an asset for the beneficiary and sells it to him at a markup. The 
beneficiary can either make a single deferred payment or multiple deferred payments over time. 
The purchase, sale price, and markup are determined when the contract is signed at the original 
sale. Profit margins are seen as acceptable for IFIs because they are considered compensation for 
the time value of the money used to buy the asset (Robbins 2010). Rules regarding the value 
associated with the time, however, are ambiguous and leave the door open for excessive markups 
in the place of excessive interest rates in traditional finance. The mark-up differs from interest in 
name, but is functionally the same as a fixed interest loan. In theory, the IFI bears the risk of 
purchasing and owning the asset pending the client’s purchase (Hourani 2004), but in practice 
the buyer is committed to the purchase prior to the bank’s purchase of the asset, and the bank 
only owns the asset for a negligible amount of time. In microfinance, murabahah reduces the risk 
of moral hazard as an asset is purchased for the client rather than distributing monetary loans 
(Atia 2011). Although there is no legal limit on the size of markups, assuming IMFIs stay true to 
their social goals, the markup is expected to be fair.  
A variation on mudarabah is tawarruq. Because the lease of a physical asset cannot 
support all endeavors, Islamic finance has created solutions like tawarruq. In its simplest form, 
tawarruq is an arrangement in which a company or individual buys a commodity from a bank or 
institution and then resells the commodity to a third party for liquid funds (Robbins 2010). 
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Tawarruq, however, has been widely criticized in terms of its sharia compliance since the assets 
are not actually held.  
3.5.5 Ijarah 
Ijarah, which means compensation or substitute, is most like a simple lease in traditional finance. 
It is a contract that involves the lease of an asset for an agreed-upon period in exchange for 
predetermined compensation and uses that capital to generate revenues (Robbins 2010). The 
lease is normally not for the entire useful life of the asset, but for a shorter, renewable period. 
The lessor is the owner of this capital, thus, in the ideal contract, bears the risk and responsibility 
of ownership, including upkeep of the asset (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). In practice, this is unlikely. 
The lender reserves the right to renegotiate the contract. The beneficiary, in traditional ijarah 
agreements, does not have the option to purchase the asset at the end of the leasing term because 
it is considered as excessive uncertainty (Hourani 2004). This, however, seems impractical, 
which is why there is ijarah wa iktina, a variation on traditional ijarah.  
In ijarah wa iktina, the beneficiary leases the capital equipment at an agreed-upon rate as 
in ijarah, but because there is danger of misuse in short term leases, the lessee has the option at 
the signing of the contract to purchase the asset at market value at the end of the lease, with lease 
payments included as part of the price (Iqbal and Ariff 2011).  
3.5.6 Salam 
Salam, or a deferred contract, is a sales contract for which the price is paid in advance at the time 
the contract is signed against the delivery of a good or service at a future date. Both the price and 
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date must be defined explicitly in the contract. This is similar to conventional futures contracts, 
but is only applied to fungible commodities (Iqbal and Ariff 2011) and is often used to finance 
agriculture production (Hourani 2004). 
3.5.7 Takaful 
Takaful is an alternative to insurance and is carried out ideally on the tenets of shared 
responsibility, brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual security from risk (Iqbal and Ariff 2011). 
Insurance alongside microfinance has been growing in practice, thus an Islamic alternative is an 
important tool for a comprehensive and inclusive Islamic microfinance system. A contribution, 
or premium, is made by the participant and is put into two accounts: one for investment and 
another that is treated as a donation (Ma’sum Billah 2007). Generally, the idea is that 
beneficiaries pay into a mutual pool of funds that can be drawn upon in the future in case of a 
financial emergency, usually based on the share they commit. All of those paying in would be 
owners of the fund. This is in place of conventional insurance, in which the policyholder would 
pay a premium to a third party that could either make or lose money based on how many of their 
clients make claims, indicating uncertainty. The transaction in the takaful structure is supposedly 
free from uncertainty, unjust enrichment, and interest (Ma’sum Billah 2007). Ahmed (2007) 
argues that takaful in microfinance could be a form of insurance on repayment. A reserve would 
be created by small contributions from the borrowers and would be used to support them if they 
are unable to make a payment on time due to an unexpected problem. 
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3.6 Use of Products 
The products most common in Islamic microfinance are murabahah, qard al-hassan, musharakah, 
and mudarabah. While a number of products not listed exist, the supply is concentrated in those 
three, and overwhelmingly in murabahah and qard al-hassan. Figure 2 below shows the 
breakdown of portfolio by product type.  
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Figure 2: Portfolio by Type of Product. 
Source: El-Zoghbi and Tarazi  (2013) 
3.7 Organizational Structures 
Like conventional finance, the types of institutions offering sharia-compliant microfinance vary 
greatly. In Islamic microfinance, 77% of institutions are village or rural banks. These are 
organizations that are member-based, such as financial cooperatives or credit unions, and often 
rely on pooled savings as the primary source of funds. Within these organizations, members 
usually have a commonality like location. The benefit of membership lies in the distribution or 
use of profits directly for members. These types of institutions are highly common in Indonesia 
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and in areas where formal institutional registration would create excessive obstacles (Obaidullah 
and Khan 2008).  
NGOs, a common form of organization in conventional microfinance, are the second 
most common form of IMFIs. They typically pursue both a social objective and microfinance. 
Islamic NGOs also often rely on a donor base to operate. In addition to questions of financial 
sustainability, NGOs face criticism regarding their boards not representing shareholders with the 
money at stake and are limited in the products that they can offer since they face more 
restrictions, such as laws prohibiting non-bank institutions from collecting savings. Islamic 
NGOs also face pressure from some critics to strive for greater financial sustainability and 
pursue commercialization, which can lead to mission drift (Obaidullah and Khan 2008).  
Engaging in financial inclusiveness is not limited to NGOs and community organizations. 
Obaidullah and Khan (2008) explain that commercial banks, especially those with social 
missions like Islamic banks, can greatly benefit the poor. As commercial banks have more 
resources, they can use their branch networks, wide variety of services, and funds to help 
improve systems and technical skills. Through mobilizing their resources and capitalizing on 
their capabilities, they have the potential to reach and positively impact those lacking access to 
modern financial products or training. Further, while commercial banks make up only 3% of 
IMFIs, they represent 60% of clients served, showing that the outreach potential of commercial 
institutions is high (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi 2013). Although, as in conventional microfinance, 
commercialized Islamic microfinance banks typically serve the less poor.   
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Figure 3: Institutions Offering Islamic Microfinance Products and Client Reach by Institution Type 
Source: El-Zoghbi and Tarazi (2013) 
3.8 Mitigating Risk 
One of the features of both conventional and Islamic microfinance is correcting information 
asymmetries. Adverse selection and moral hazard, discussed previously, can be mitigated with 
interventions like requiring collateral or monitoring. However, when working with the poor, 
requiring collateral can be near impossible and monitoring accrues extra costs due to the large 
volume and small size of the loans.  
In Islamic microfinance, groups are used to mitigate information asymmetries in a similar 
way to conventional microfinance, but with some important distinctions. The group structure 
with peer pressure allows the IMFI to use Islamic brotherhood along with the religious duty of 
debt repayment to strengthen the group relationship and ensure the payment of installments. 
These ethics underlying the religious structure of the organization are solidified through the 
educational component of the social development program that most IMFIs employ (Ahmed 
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2002). The Islamic approach has several additional benefits. For example, borrowers are often 
more comfortable with the provisions of the contract as they take place within a larger religious 
context. Borrowers also, in the spirit of comradeship in Islamic teachings, are often willing to 
help one another when a payment may be missed. Additionally, not paying back debt is 
considered sinful, which creates another motivation to repay (Ahmed 2002).   
El-Komi and Croson (2013) conducted a study in which compliance is tested in profit and 
loss sharing (PLS) contracts used in some Islamic microfinance arrangements versus interest-
based contracts used in conventional microfinance. They find that compliance rates are 
significantly higher for joint ventures (regardless of enforcement) and profit sharing contracts 
(with enforcement) than in interest-based contracts. They attribute this trend to increased feelings 
of obligation to comply with an equitable contract. PLS contracts, however, remain a large 
minority in Islamic microfinance, even though they represent the ideal contractual form. Despite 
this, a greater focus on these types of contracts could prove to be beneficial in terms of 
mitigating risk, if monitoring or other costs can be limited.  
3.9 Sustainability 
As with conventional microfinance, the question of sustainability is integral to the future of 
Islamic microfinance. The main problem is many IMFIs are funded by subsidies. Subsidies are 
important initially, but most microfinance scholars agree that firms should aim to pursue self-
sufficiency. However, for IMFIs especially, the push for sustainability is weakened by the 
widespread provision of financial services for the poor being seen as an act of charity (El-Zoghbi 
and Tarazi 2013). In the case of IMFIs funded through waqf endowments, costs are already 
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lower by virtue of the charitable characteristics of the waqf whose providers do not expect 
returns (Ahmed 2007). The unique funding nature and the religious-based charitable character of 
IMFIs compared to conventional MFIs could make pursing financial self-sufficiency in place of 
relying on subsidies and donations less of an issue for IMFIs. However, most conventional 
literature calls for self-sufficiency and El-Zoghbi and Tarazi (2013) suggest that more 
experimentation in methods of product delivery is necessary so that IMFIs can find better ways 
to reduce costs and improve financial self-sufficiency.  
The nature of Islamic banks is another aspect of the IFS that could lead to increased 
sustainability, as they ideally have a social mission and could engage in microfinance if the 
situation is beneficial to both parties. Because of their scale, banks can provide services at lower 
operating costs than MFIs. They could also capitalize on their existing infrastructure to provide 
financial services to the poor without having the additional expenses of rent, utilities, and 
manpower if branches are already present in or near poor areas. Islamic banks, which have more 
liquidity than other financial institutions due to the shorter-term nature of most sharia-compliant 
financial market instruments, could use their extra funds relatively easily to engage in 
microfinance at little extra cost and more efficiently than IMFIs operating independently (Ahmed 
2007).  
3.10 Women and Islamic Microfinance 
The conversation about women is inseparable from that of microfinance, and skeptics consider it 
a significant issue in the formation of a viable Islamic microfinance industry. IMFIs have the 
potential to benefit and empower Muslim women, and in gender-segregated societies, the need to 
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provide women with financial services is no less relevant. Despite working with women being 
complicated at times due to social codes, IMFIs in Muslim countries have improved their 
outreach to women, who now comprise over 50% of customers on average (Siraj and Lim 2005). 
However, this average varies significantly by country and even with these gains, Abdelkader and 
Salem (2013) suggest that conventional MFIs are better at empowering women, though the sheer 
volume of borrowers that conventional MFIs reach may impact this.  
Targeting women does not only have potential effects like female empowerment, but is 
also reflective of the proportion of the poor that women represent (Hailey 2009).2 Karim, Tarazi, 
and Reille (2008) cite Islamic microfinance as having client bases that are 59% female on 
average, but this can reach as high as over 90% in Bangladesh or the West Bank and Gaza. 
IMFIs, like conventional MFIs, choose to focus on women for a number of reasons, including 
elements of social pressure, risk, empowerment, and access to families. Women tend to be more 
susceptible to social pressure, thus the threat of social collateral is stronger. A number of studies 
also agree that women generally pick less risky investments than men. Empowerment, a theme 
common in the discussion on microfinance and women, is also seen as a benefit of engaging with 
women through Islamic microfinance, as it can give them financial authority that they often do 
not otherwise have. Benefiting the family unit is another reason targeting women is seen as 
beneficial because they are generally more concerned with the wellbeing of their children and 
often work from home. Working from home also makes women easier to monitor, as they are 
less mobile than their male counterparts (Hailey 2009).  
Aspects of different Islamic societies can make it more difficult for microfinance to work 
with women. For example, in Saudi Arabia women cannot drive, greatly limiting their mobility. 
2 Roughly 70% of 1.3 billion people living on less than $1 per day. 
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More broadly, in conservative societies, there can be large stigmas against women being alone 
with men outside of their families. These barriers could make it difficult for loans to be 
administered to women and for women to be employed to do the administration (Hailey 2009). 
This could call efficiency and empowerment into question, as male relatives may have to be 
present for transactions between the IMFI and the female borrower. Conservative social codes 
could also make running a business more difficult in general for women.  
Hailey (2009) asks the question of whether MFIs should only work in places where 
women can sign their own contract, control their own loan, and run their own business, or rather 
if the goal of MFIs should be to improve the economic outlook wherever they operate. Even 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh faced problems loaning to women in the beginning due to 
conservative communities having issues with granting women greater independence and 
allowing them to meet with officers alone. Over time, as the positive effects of microfinance 
were realized, these barriers were eroded, and Grameen now has a 97% female client base 
(Hailey 2009). It is hopeful that a similar trend could occur in other conservative areas, slowly 
working to give women more independence and freedom to pursue profitable projects. Despite 
the greater difficulty women face operating in conservative contexts, Costa, Makhlouf, and 
Mazaud (2010) cite that approximately 86% of women engaged in Islamic microfinance in Egypt 
note a positive impact from microfinance in general and 45% report improvements in their life 
relating to education and economic possibilities since they began participating in microfinance.  
 Habib Ahmed (2002) explains his interpretation of an effective and efficient IMFI and 
how the question of women might be addressed in Islamic microfinance differently from 
conventional microfinance: the focus on empowering the family unit rather than women 
individually. MFIs target women because they believe that women make better clients, become 
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more empowered, and respect themselves more through financial liberation and independence. 
However, some studies have shown that there are instances where men either use their wives to 
obtain credit or end up controlling all or a portion of the funds they receive, while leaving the 
women responsible for repayment. This can create problems within the family and can 
undermine any empowerment that may have been achieved. Ahmed explains that, while IMFIs 
tend to work with women directly, the focus should be on the family. This alternative focus 
would be reflected in the contract, which both the woman and her husband sign and are jointly 
responsible for. Contact is maintained mostly with the women, as they are easier to work with 
and more able to attend weekly meetings. The women are also the primary participants in the 
social development program, a part of which teaches Islamic values and is seen as favorable by 
society because women impart those teachings on their children. The biggest advantage of the 
family unit approach is minimizing tensions regarding the loan within the family. Costa, 
Makhlouf, and Mazaud (2010) explain that focusing on the family avoids disturbing social codes 
in patriarchal societies, which allows for greater outreach, although this explanation is 
controversial for skeptics who champion women’s empowerment through microfinance. 
Regardless of the benefits of adherence to social convention, it could be the case that this 
structure still places most of the responsibility on the woman without giving her any additional 
freedom or independence.   
3.11 Limitations of Islamic Finance and Microfinance 
There are a number of problems that Islamic finance and microfinance face as they develop into 
larger and more global industries. First, Islamic finance has spread across the globe. Each 
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country has its own unique legal code and various religious sects have their own interpretations 
and rules that can change unexpectedly, contributing to confusion and instability in the system 
(Robbins 2010). Greater coordination through Islamic international organizations would mitigate 
inconsistencies and could offer recommendations for legal frameworks that would allow for 
greater policy unification. IMFIs also have a great need for improved networks to share 
resources for purposes such as discussing regulations, sharing information, and scaling training 
programs. There are several regional networks, but a major coordinating body to unify the sector, 
improve efficiency, and create regulations could be greatly beneficial.  
Second, many Ulama serve on a number of boards and advise companies and 
governments while being auditors, consultants, and clients (Bianchi 2007), making conflicts of 
interest a compounded problem. Regulations on the number and variety of advising positions a 
single scholar may hold would reduce this problem. However, this could lead to further problems 
as there is a limited supply of scholars with the specialization necessary to serve on sharia 
boards. Therefore, an increase in scholars specialized in this field is necessary in order to 
implement regulations that reduce conflicts of interest without also constraining the ability of 
IFIs to fill their boards.  
A third issue is that the sector heavily relies on murabahah, which has been subject to a 
great deal of criticism focusing on how the markup structure is essentially charging interest (El-
Komi, Mohamed, and Croson 2013). Critics of the industry often argue that, in practice, Islamic 
finance is just the repackaging of conventional financial products that do not offer many real 
changes, and that clients can be dissatisfied by the lack of substantive differences.  
Fourth, IFIs must adapt to challenges like integrating with the global financial system and 
penetrating markets with different interpretations of sharia law and conflicting cultural, political, 
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and economic conditions. For example, as Islamic banks seek to penetrate Western markets, they 
must deal with skepticism and current overblown fears of manipulation by terrorist groups 
(Robbins 2010). 
The limited availability of funds presents a fifth issue for IMFIs, making growth and 
efficiency difficult to achieve. Funds available from governments can have restrictive conditions 
and other external funding sources may be given on or require interest, making them non-sharia 
compliant (Ahmed 2007). Although donations can mitigate the limited supply of funds, financial 
unsustainability due to reliance on charity is not necessarily good for the growth of the sector. 
According to Karim, Tarzai, and Reille (2008), firms should focus on becoming self-sufficient if 
Islamic microfinance is to be viable on a large scale.  
Sixth, the costs associated with administering and monitoring many of the sharia-
compliant products make financial sustainability difficult. For example, using sale-based, profit 
sharing, and partnership modes of financing decreases operational efficiency and sustainably 
because of the small scale of operations and the high cost of monitoring (Ahmed 2007). Products 
like mudarabah and musharakah require high amounts of reporting, monitoring, and transparency 
for the transactions to be completed fairly. So even though these modes are sharia-compliant, the 
opportunity cost makes them difficult to scale for efficiency (Ahmed 2002). These monitoring 
costs are among the reasons that profit sharing and partnership methods of financing have been 
employed substantially less than other methods.  
Finally, there is a deficit in education and training among borrowers and officers, which 
can limit the growth of the firm. To be successful, the sector needs more resource centers and 
training programs in local languages (Obaidullah and Khan 2008).  
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The Islamic microfinance sector offers great potential for aiding the Muslim poor. To 
become a large-scale contender of conventional microfinance, more reforms must be made to 
create a comprehensive and efficient method of alleviating poverty (Obaidullah and Khan 2008). 
Despite its limitations, Islamic finance has been making impressive strides and shows potential 
for penetrating untapped markets. As this expansion continues, better networks and more 
uniform regulations will likely follow out of necessity and a greater number of scholars will 
emerge, which will decrease conflict of interest on sharia boards and provide greater expertise on 
the Islamic finance and microfinance sectors. 
3.13 Achievements and Prospects 
Islamic microfinance offers some benefits and advantages that conventional microfinance lacks. 
Social sanctions resulting from default are often not as extreme in Islamic microfinance as they 
can be in conventional microfinance. Due to aspects of risk and profit sharing (although PLS 
contracts account for less than 10% of the sector), investors and clients share the investment and 
the risk, so the agreement is attractive for both. This contributes to borrowers carrying less risk 
than in conventional microfinance. Under some contracts, the lending institution becomes a co-
owner of the business, cultivating greater interest, a stake in its success, and allowing for the 
possibility of high returns if the investment is successful and does not have a decreasing contract 
or buyout mechanism (International 2012). However, these contracts are the minority. A greater 
focus on such contracts could create socially beneficial results, but as mentioned above, might be 
unrealistic due to their costs. The structure of Islamic finance also addresses one of the main 
concerns in conventional microfinance of exorbitant interest rates by forbidding interest, 
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although there still exists the opportunity for firms to effectively charge high rates through the 
markup. 
Finally, Islamic microfinance mitigates two major issues in conventional microfinance 
relating to the use of funds. The use of zakat funds for consumption smoothing and the 
prevalence of IMFIs dealing in assets rather than money helps prevent loans and assets from 
being diverted for other purposes (Ahmed 2002). The risk of the user of the funds being different 
from the beneficiary can also be mitigated by the focus on the family unit. When firms expect 
family members to use the funds jointly for productive purposes, the problem is diminished since 
the relevant parties are liable to the contract.  
Islamic microfinance presents great potential for addressing some of the problems that 
arise when expanding financial inclusion to poor or rural communities. With technical issues 
addressed, regulation improved, and cooperation expanded, Islamic microfinance can be a real 
contender of conventional microfinance in providing financial tools for the Muslim poor. It 
remains an important question, however, to determine if Islamic microfinance can achieve the 
outreach and financial sustainability requisite for being a viable industry in the long run.  
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4.0 Previous Analyses on Financial Sustainability and Outreach 
While many studies have been conducted evaluating the effect of different variables on the 
outreach and financial sustainability of conventional MFIs, only two previous studies have been 
found that evaluate the outreach or financial sustainability of Islamic MFIs versus conventional 
MFIs.  
Habib Ahmed (2002) critically analyzes conventional MFIs and presents IMFIs as a 
viable alternative both theoretically and empirically through a study on three IMFIs in 
Bangladesh. His findings are based on information collected in a field survey and interviews 
with institution officials. Ahmed examines financial profitability and efficiency by comparing 
profitability indicators such as total profit (income-expenses) and operating income (operating 
income-expenses) and efficiency indicators such as return on assets (ROA) (net income/total 
assets), net interest margin (NIM) [(investment returns-interest expenses)/average earning 
assets], operating costs as a percentage of loan disbursed (OCL), and beneficiaries to employee 
ratio (BER). ROA is used to indicate how well the institution’s assets are used to generate 
income. NIM measures the efficiency of the intermediation of funds from different sources to 
users. OCL is an indicator of operating efficiency and should be smaller for IMFIs, as they focus 
on small loan sizes/funds. Finally, BER measures the efficiency of employees in reaching the 
beneficiaries.  
In assessing profitability, Ahmed (2002) concludes that IMFIs have the ability to be 
sufficiently profitable. In his assessment of their efficiency, Ahmed compares the results for each 
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bank with Grameen Bank, as it is well established and is the largest MFI in Bangladesh. Overall, 
the three IMFIs compare relatively well to Grameen Bank. Ahmed finds comparable or better 
results for the efficient generation and use of funds, but poorer results for efficiently reaching 
borrowers. Ahmed concludes that the three Bangladeshi IMFIs in his study perform better than 
Grameen Bank overall. He argues that this could be due to the benefits of social capital that 
come from Islamic values and principles: employees have a religious incentive to work to 
improve the lives of the poor, Islamic teachings increase solidarity among beneficiaries and 
improve social collateral, and beneficiaries consider repayment of a debt a religious obligation 
under Islam. Thus, Ahmed suggests that, at least in Bangladesh, Islamic microfinance is a viable 
alternative for conventional microfinance.   
Abdelkader and Salem (2013) test the financial performance and outreach of IMFIs and 
conventional MFIs in MENA countries. They use a non-parametric data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to estimate the efficiency of microfinance firms in the MENA region. The study analyzes 
65 Arab MFIs in Sudan, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia from 2005-2010. They use 3 inputs and 2 outputs, similar to other DEA model analyses 
of MFIs. Inputs are resources used by the unit to produce its output, which are the measures of 
efficiency. In this study, they use total assets, number of employees, and operating expenses as 
inputs and financial revenue and active borrowers*% female borrowers as outputs. Financial 
revenue measures financial performance, while active borrowers*% female borrowers measures 
the breadth and depth of outreach.  
The study shows that conventional firms employ 3 times as many people and have five 
times as many female clients as Islamic firms. They argue that this suggests that conventional 
firms better achieve the empowerment of women. However, this could be unclear due to the 
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potential focus on family making it unclear how the loan is classified and who is benefiting most 
from the loan. There is also the unresolved argument on whether reaching women is even a true 
indicator of actual empowerment. The estimators indicate that IMFIs were more efficient than 
conventional MFIs from 2005-2007, but conventional MFIs performed better than IMFIs from 
2007-2011. The authors conduct a hypothesis test to analyze whether the efficiencies of the 
groups are identical and conclude that they are, meaning that neither conventional nor Islamic 
firms perform better. They determine that, based on a non-parametric DEA model, there is not a 
statistical difference between the efficiency of Islamic and conventional MFIs and that religion, 
or the use of sharia-compliant products, does not affect the efficiency of an MFI in the MENA 
region. Therefore, they suggest that Islamic microfinance could be a viable alternative to 
conventional microfinance in the MENA region.  
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5.0 Data and Methodology 
5.1 Overview of the Empirical Model 
This study analyzes the outreach and financial sustainability of Islamic and conventional 
microfinance firms in the MENA region following a method similar to that of Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch (2006), which analyses the financial performance and outreach of MFIs 
globally. This study follows their method in using cross-country OLS regressions to determine 
the effects of the independent variable on the same financial sustainability and outreach 
indicators, but analyzes different independent variables, focusing instead on the impact of being 
an Islamic firm on the indicators, and employs a time series element as well.  
5.2 Data and Sample 
The data on MFIs used in this study are from the Microfinance Information Exchange (the MIX). 
The MIX is the leading source of objective, qualified performance data on microfinance firms. 
Firms for this study are selected based on the quality and extent of their data between the years 
of 2010-2013. One potential complication about data from the MIX is that generally only top 
firms are willing to provide their data, so the dataset may only contain institutions committed to 
financial sustainability and that are willing to comply with the MIX’s reporting standards. 
However, even though the firms are supposed to comply with certain standards to be listed on 
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the MIX, data is self-reported and financial data is often unreliable coming out of the Middle 
East and North Africa. This could therefore pose a potential complication in terms of accuracy.  
In this study, firms are selected from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and 
Yemen with the condition that they use sufficient data for one or more independent indicators in 
one or more of the years 2010-2013. The dataset includes 11 firms from Egypt (20.37%), 8 from 
Iraq (14.81%), 8 from Jordan (14.81%), 6 from Lebanon (11.11%), 9 from Palestine (16.67%), 3 
from Syria (5.56%), and 9 from Yemen (16.67%). The firms represent a relatively even spread 
across MENA countries with the exception of Egypt, which accounts for slightly more MFIs, and 
Syria, which accounts for slightly fewer. 17 IMFIs and 37 conventional MFIs make up the 54 
total firms analyzed in this study. Islamic firms are less common than conventional firms, so the 
unequal representation is expected. As any complete set of data from any year in the time period 
is used as a sample, many firms are represented over 2-3 years as different samples, resulting in 
146 total samples. However, not all of these have the requisite information to be included in all 
of the regressions, so the sample size varies across different regressions. 
 As presented in table 3, the firms represented in this study comprise 37 NGOs (68.5%), 6 
NBFIs (11.11%), 7 banks (12.96 %), and 4 “other” types of institutions (7.41%). In the 
breakdown of Islamic firms, 11 are NGOs (64.71%), 3 are NBFIs (17.65%), 3 are banks (17.65% 
of Islamic firms), and 1 is an “other” type of institution (5.88%). Among the conventional firms, 
26 are NGOs (70.27%), 3 are NBFIs (8.11% of conventional firms), 5 are banks (13.51%), and 3 
are “other” types of institutions (8.11%). NGOs make up the majority of both Islamic and 
conventional firms in this study, followed by banks, NBFIs, and the “other” classification, 
respectively.  
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Table 3: All Firms by Structure 
Overall Structures of MFIs 
Conventional 
NGO 
26 
Islamic NGO 11 
Conventional 
NBFI 
3 
Islamic NBFI 3 
 Conventional 
Bank 
5 
Islamic Bank 2 
Other  3 
Islamic Other 1 
Total 54 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
5.3 Variables 
5.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Following the method used in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2006), the key dependent 
variables for financial sustainability are financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and return on assets 
(ROA) (explanations of variables and summary statistics can be found in table 4). FSS measures 
the ability to generate sufficient revenue to cover costs, indicated as being able to do so by a 
value above 1. Higher values for FSS are associated with improved financial sustainability. ROA 
is the ratio that indicates the profit the MFI earns as a percentage of its overall resources. Higher 
values for ROA are also associated with improved financial sustainability.  
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Also following Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2006), the dependent variables for 
outreach are average balance per borrower (ABB)/GNI per capita and the share of loans 
extended to women (explanations of variables and summary statistics can be found in table 4). 
ABB/GNI per capita is a measure of loan size and is used as an indicator for outreach because 
smaller loan sizes typically indicate better outreach to poor borrowers. Therefore lower values of 
ABB/GNI per capita are associated with better outreach. The average loan size is divided by GNI 
per capita to normalize the loan size so that it is adjusted for the average wealth of the country. A 
slight problem could surface from this indicator because it does not address inequality within 
countries, but in a similarly structured study, Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2006) find 
that the results for ABB/GNI per capita are comparable to those for ABB/GNI per capita of the 
poorest 20%, which accounts for inequality. The share of loans extended to women is used as an 
indicator for outreach because women are generally poorer clients, and most literature cites an 
increase in the percentage of female clients as a positive indicator of outreach and social benefit. 
Therefore, higher percentages of female borrowers are associated with better outreach.  
5.3.2 Independent Variables 
A number of qualitative and quantitative independent variables (explanations of variables and 
summary statistics can be found in table 4) are used in the regressions that account for the sharia-
compliance of the firm, profitability, institutional structure, interest rate (or effective interest 
rate), the firm’s age, size and costs, lending mechanism, how many loans different staff members 
are responsible for, the share of women that make up the firm’s clients, and the country that the 
firm is located in.  
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 FSS is also used as an independent variable in the outreach regressions because the 
profitability of the firm could impact its ability to reach poor customers and can indicate worse 
outreach if higher profitability is associated with larger loans. Therefore, it is expected that 
higher values of FSS will have a positive impact on ABB/GNI per capita, indicating larger loans 
and poorer outreach measures. It is not expected that the value of FSS will have a significant 
impact on the percentage of borrowers who are female. FSS is chosen as the measure of 
profitability over ROA because it includes more inputs and outputs and is a stronger indicator of 
profitability and financial soundness.  
Percent female borrowers is also used as a dependent variable in the financial 
sustainability models because women often have a higher repayment rate than men, which may 
affect the profitability of the firm. Therefore, it is expected that higher percentages of borrowers 
who are female will have a positive impact on both FSS and ROA.  
 The variable Islamic is the indicator for sharia compliance and is a binary variable for 
which a value of 1 indicates that the firm is sharia-compliant. A value of 0 indicates that the firm 
lends through conventional methods. Conventional firm is the omitted variable for this 
designation, so the coefficient on the Islamic variable will represent the effect of sharia-
compliance relative to ordinary methods of microfinance. This variable is the primary 
consideration for this study and is expected to be insignificant for all dependent variables in both 
financial sustainability and outreach models, which would indicate that IMFIs do not perform 
differently than conventional MFIs.    
 The variable age is a measure of how long the firm has been operating. It is expected that 
older firms will be more financially sustainable than younger firms. An increase in the age value, 
therefore, should have a positive impact on both financial sustainability indicators. Regarding the 
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outreach indicators, the MFI’s age could be associated in two ways: an increase in age might 
improve outreach as the firm has better resources and methods to reach poorer borrowers, 
resulting in a negative association with loan size, or an increase in age could coincide with 
mission drift and be positively associated with larger loans. This study will not take a particular 
expectation with how the age of the MFI will impact outreach, but will include the variable as a 
point of interest to see if one effect outweighs the other or if it proves to be insignificant. The age 
variable is the logged value of the firm’s age in years to control for a wide range of age values. 
 The real yield is the real yield on the gross loan portfolio, which is a measure of interest 
(or what would effectively be interest in Islamic finance). The squared real yield accounts for the 
potential nonlinear effect of the interest rate on financial sustainability and outreach indicators. 
The indicator of interest is expected to be nonlinear and have an initial positive effect on both 
financial sustainability indicators and then eventually take on a negative effect. The real yield 
and squared real yield are not expected to have a significant impact on the percentage of 
borrowers who are female. Higher values of real yield and squared real yield combined are 
expected to be associated with smaller values ABB/GNI per capita, as firms often charge higher 
rates on smaller loans. 
The effect that being a sharia-compliant institution has on the real yield and squared real 
yield’s effects on the dependent variables is accounted for by the interaction of the Islamic 
variable with both the real yield and squared real yield variables. These interactions derive the 
more specific effects of being an Islamic MFI. Specially, these coefficients will indicate the 
difference between the effects of the interest rate that the real yield variables account for and the 
effects of sharia-compliant methods of financing that do not require a formal interest rate. The 
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effect of being Islamic on the real yield variables’ effect on the financial sustainability indicators 
is expected to be insignificant.   
 The institution variables are binary variables that account for whether the MFI is 
structured as a bank, NBFI, NGO, or an “other” institution. These variables account for the 
possibility that the institutional structure of the MFI could have a significant impact on the 
outcomes for financial sustainability and outreach. Each institutional structure is represented by a 
binary variable with a value of 1 indicating that that is the structure of the firm and a value of 0 
indicating that the firm has a different structure. The variable bank is the omitted variable. Banks 
are for-profit institutions, so it is expected that they have a greater positive impact on financial 
sustainability than the other structures. Being more commonly for-profit, they would also likely 
have an association with larger loan sizes compared to the other institutions since small loans are 
riskier and more expensive to service, indicating poorer outreach. The coefficients of the 
institution types indicate how that institution type compares relative to banks. NBFIs are 
generally structurally similar to banks, but may not operate as commercially and have different 
requirements and characteristics depending on each country’s laws. For these reasons, it is 
expected that they will perform slightly worse than banks in terms of financial sustainability and 
should therefore have a negative impact on the financial sustainability indicators. Similarly it is 
expected that they should perform better than banks in terms of outreach to poor borrowers. 
Therefore, being a NBFI should have a positive effect on the percentage of borrowers who are 
female and a negative impact on ABB/GNI per capita. NGOs are usually non-profit MFIs and 
are commonly associated with better outreach performance and poorer financial performance 
than banks. Therefore it is expected that being a NGO will have a negative impact on both 
indicators of financial sustainability, a positive impact on the percentage of borrowers who are 
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female, and a negative impact on the ABB/GNI per capita. The “other” variable indicates that the 
firm is not a bank, NBFI, or NGO and might have a unique structure or classification in the host-
country’s legal system. Because of that ambiguity, this study takes no specific expectation with 
how being an “other” MFI will impact the financial sustainability and outreach indicators.  
 The effect that being an Islamic MFI has on the institution type’s effect on the dependent 
variables is accounted for by the interaction of being Islamic with the NGO and NBFI variables. 
The effect of being an IMFI on the effect of being an “other” institution cannot be included 
because of collinearity. These interactions indicate whether being sharia-compliant affects the 
dependent variables differently across the various institution types and are not expected to be 
statistically significant for any of the indicators of financial sustainability or outreach.  
 The lending mechanism is accounted for by the solidarity variable. This indicates the 
percentage of loans in the MFI’s portfolio that are administered through solidarity groups. The 
solidarity variable will indicate the effect on the dependent variable relative to individual loans. 
Solidarity loans are commonly associated with poorer communities and smaller loans, so a 
negative impact on the ABB/GNI is expected. Group solidarity loans are also often associated 
with groups of poor, rural women, so a positive association with the female indicator is expected. 
Solidarity loans are expected to have a positive impact on measures of financial sustainability 
because, despite being typically associated with riskier groups and institutions like NGOs, 
lending through this method is expected to increase repayment rates, which would have a 
positive effect on financial sustainability.  
 The rural variable indicates the percentage of the firm’s clients that are located in rural 
areas. Greater outreach is generally associated with reaching rural, poorer areas, so it is expected 
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that a greater percentage of rural borrowers vis-à-vis urban borrowers would have a negative 
effect on loan size and a positive effect on the percentage of borrowers who are female.  
 The size of the firm is accounted for through the size of its gross loan portfolio (GLP). 
The log of the GLP is used to account for the wide range of values across MFIs. The expectation 
is that larger firms can reach more borrowers, thus the effect of the firm size on outreach may be 
negative for ABB/GNI per capita. It is not expected that the firm size will have a significant 
impact on the percentage of borrowers who are female. Since larger firms have more borrowers, 
the effect of the associated risk of any one borrower is reduced. This diversification of borrowers 
is expected to lead to higher revenues and have a positive impact on financial sustainability.  
 The costs associated with servicing loans are accounted for by the cost per loan (CPL) 
variable. The higher the CPL, the less profitable and financially sustainable we would expect the 
firm to be, therefore an increase in the CPL is expected to have a negative impact on the FSS and 
ROA. A higher ratio, however, could be associated with greater outreach because the loans of 
rural and poorer clients are more expensive to monitor and service. There is not expected to be a 
significant impact of the CPL on the percentage of borrowers who are female.  
 The variable measuring the average number of loans each staff member needs to service 
is loans per staff member (LPSM). The higher this ratio is, the less expensive administrative 
costs are expected to be, thus is expected to result in a positive effect on financial sustainability. 
A higher value of LPSM is expected to have a negative impact on the outreach, as each staff 
member would have less time to administer the smaller, more time consuming loans associated 
with better outreach, though it might indicate greater number of clients reached. Therefore it is 
expected that an increase in the LPSM will have a positive impact on the ABB/GNI per capita, 
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indicating larger loan sizes. The LPSM is not expected to have a significant impact on the 
percentage of borrowers who are female.   
 The Loan Loss Rate (LLR) is the value of loans written off (less those recovered) as a 
percentage of the gross loan portfolio. A higher LLR is expected to negatively impact the 
financial sustainability indicators and is not expected to have a significant impact on the 
percentage of borrowers who are female.  
 The Donations variable is the ratio of funds donated to the firm divided by assets to 
normalize the value of donations across firms of different sizes. A high value of donations is 
expected to negatively impact both measures of financial sustainability. Larger donation sizes are 
also expected to have a positive impact on measures of outreach, so it is expected that increases 
in the donation sizes will have a positive effect on the percentage of borrowers who are female 
and a negative impact on the ABB/GNI per capita.  
 The model controls for firms being located in different countries by including binary 
variables for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. Egypt is the omitted variable, 
so the coefficients on each country will indicate the effect that that country’s location has on 
financial sustainability and outreach relative to MFIs in Egypt. This study does not take a 
specific expectation regarding how the MFI’s location will impact the indicators of financial 
sustainability and outreach, but includes the countries to control for varying situations and 
factors across countries.    
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Table 4: Variable Descriptions & Summary Statistics 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean 
(std. dev.) 
Min Max 
Financial self-sufficiency 
(FSS) 
Adjusted operating revenue / 
(Financial expense + Loan-loss 
provision expense + Operating 
expense + Expense adjustments) 
 
1.421 
(0.636) 
-0.433 4.3443 
Return on assets (ROA) (Net adjusted operating income – 
taxes) / Average Assets  
 
 
0.043    
(0.132)  
-0.880  0.2614 
Percent female (Female) Number of female clients / Total 
number of clients  
 
0.560    
(0.300)  
0 1 
Average balance per 
borrower / GNI per capita 
(ABBGNI) 
(Gross loan portfolio / number of 
borrowers) / GNI per capita 
2.073     
(18.800) 
 
0.049 216.940 
Islamic  1 = Islamic  0.295    
 (0.457) 
 
0 1 
Age (LogAge) Log(age)  2.326     
(0.707)  
 
0 4.143 
Real yield (RealYield) Cash financial revenue from loan 
portfolio / Average gross loan 
portfolio 
 
0.204     
(0.086) 
-0.038  0.439 
Real yield * Islamic 
(RYIslamic) 
(Cash financial revenue from loan 
portfolio / Average gross loan 
portfolio) x Islamic 
0.052  
(0.091) 
 
 
0 0.341 
Squared real yield 
(Yieldsq) 
(Cash financial revenue from loan 
portfolio / Average gross loan 
portfolio)2 
 
0.049    
(0.038) 
 
0 0.193 
Squared real yield * 
Islamic (RY2Islamic) 
(Cash financial revenue from loan 
portfolio / Average gross loan 
portfolio)2 x Islamic 
 
0.011     
(0.02)  
0 0.116 
NGO NGO = 1 0.658    
(0.476) 
 
0 1 
NGO * Islamic (IsNGO) NGO x Islamic 0.179     
(0.385) 
 
0 1 
NBFI NBFI = 1 0.185     
(0.390) 
0 1 
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NBFI * Islamic (IsNBFI) NFBI  x Islamic 0.055     
(0.228) 
 
0 1 
Other Other  = 1 0.082    
(0.276) 
 
0 1 
Solidarity  Number of solidarity loans / Total 
number of loans 
 
0.303    
(0.350) 
0 1 
Rural Number of loans to rural residents 
/ Total number of loans 
 
0.359    
(0.304)  
0 1 
Gross loan portfolio 
(LogGLP) 
Log (gross loan portfolios) 15.945     
(1.242)  
 
12.422 18.323 
Cost per loan (CPL) Total cost of servicing loans / 
Number of loans 
170.670    
(196.183)  
 
0.737    1134.019 
Loan loss rate (LLR) (Value of write-offs - value of 
loans recovered) / average gross 
loan 
portfolio 
 
0.0167      
(0.139)  
-0.065  1.565 
Donations Value of donations / Value of 
assets 
 
0.042      
(0.133) 
 
0 1.261 
Iraq Iraq = 1 0.144      
(0.352) 
 
0 1 
Jordan Jordan = 1 0.185     
(0.390) 
 
0 1 
Lebanon Lebanon = 1 0.103     
(0.305) 
 
0 1 
Palestine Palestine = 1 0.164     
(0.372) 
 
0 1 
Syria Syria = 1 0.055     
(0.228) 
 
0 1 
Yemen Yemen = 1 0.116 
(0.322)  
0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX)
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6.0 Results and Discussion 
6.1 Financial Sustainability Models 
As mentioned before, the dependent variables used to indicate financial sustainability are 
financial self-sufficiency and return on assets. Higher values of both FSS and ROA are indicative 
of better financial sustainability. Twenty four independent variables are included that account for 
the effects of the interest rate (or markup), the firm’s age, its institutional structure, the types of 
loans it gives, its size, the cost of loaning, donations, the spread of loans over staff, the number 
of defaulted loans, the proportion of borrowers that are female, and the firm’s host country. In 
addition to these categories, variables for the interaction between the Islamic character of the 
firm and both the firms interest rate and institutional structure are included to analyze more 
precisely how being sharia-compliant affects financial sustainability. The coefficients for the 
Islamic variable, the institutional structure, the interactions between the Islamic variable and 
institutional structure, and the interactions between the Islamic variable and the real yield 
indicators represent the effect on FSS and ROA relative to a conventional, Egyptian MFI 
structured as a bank. The equations for FSS (equation 1) and ROA (equation 2) for the OLS 
regressions follow: 
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Equation 1. FSS = β0 + β1Islamic + β2RealYield + β3RYIslamic + β4Yieldsq + 
β5RY2Islamic + β6LogAge + β7NBFI + β8IsNBFI + β9NGO + β10IsNGO + β11Other + 
β12Solidarity + β13LogGLP + β14CPL + β15Donations + β16LPSM + β17LLR + β18Female 
+ β19Iraq + β20Jordan + β21Lebanon + β22Palestine + β23Syria + β24Yemen 
 
Equation 2. ROA = β0 + β1Islamic + β2RealYield + β3RYIslamic + β4Yieldsq + 
β5RY2Islamic + β6LogAge + β7NBFI + β8IsNBFI + β9NGO + β10IsNGO + β11Other + 
β12Solidarity + β13LogGLP + β14CPL + β15Donations + β16LPSM + β17LLR + β18Female 
+ β19Iraq + β20Jordan + β21Lebanon + β22Palestine + β23Syria + β24Yemen 
6.1.1 Regression Analysis for FSS and ROA 
Overall, the model produces a higher R-squared value when testing the effects of the 
independent variables on ROA, meaning that this model indicates the variables account for a 
higher percentage of the variation in ROA than they do for FSS (83.37% versus 78.06%, 
respectively). A summary of the regression output can be seen in table 5 for FSS and table 6 for 
ROA.   
6.1.1.1 Significance of Variables in the FSS Model 
Seven variables significantly and positively affect the financial self-sufficiency of the MFI. 
Following expectations, increases in the MFI’s age and LPSM have positive impacts on the FSS. 
However contrary to expectations, being an Islamic NBFI, increases in the LLR, and the 
interaction between increases in real yield and being an Islamic MFI have positive effects on the 
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financial self-sufficiency of the firm. Being located in Iraq also has a positive effect on FSS. The 
positive impacts of these variables on FSS indicate they have a positive impact on the financial 
sustainability in this model.  
Ten variables have significant and negative effects on the financial self-sufficiency of the 
MFI. Following expectations, being a NBFI or NGO, and increases in the CPL and the 
percentage of the firm’s revenues that comes from donations have negative impacts on the MFI’s 
financial self-sufficiency. Contrary to expectations, however, being Islamic, the interaction 
between the squared real yield and Islamic, and increases in the log of the GLP and percentage of 
borrowers who are female also negatively impact the FSS. Being an “other firm” and being 
located in Syria are final factors that resulted in a statistically significant negative impact on the 
MFI’s FSS. The negative impact of these variables on FSS indicates that they have a negative 
impact on financial sustainability in this model.   
Following expectations, the effect of being Islamic on the FSS of a NGO is not 
significant. The other variables that have an insignificant impact on the FSS of the MFI are the 
real yield, the squared real yield, the percentage of loans that are solidarity loans, and being 
located in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen.   
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Table 5:  Financial Self-Sufficiency Regressions  
 Variable 
Name 
Expected Sign  Coefficients  
 Islamic ns -2.227**    
(0.794) 
 
 
 RealYield + 1.667   
(2.271) 
 
 
 RYIslamic ns 18.706 ***   
(6.294)  
 
 
 Yieldsq - -1.497   
( 4.400) 
 
 
 RY2Islamic ns -44.011***    
(15.702) 
 
 
 LogAge + 0.166* 
(0.096) 
 
 
 NBFI - -1.791***    
(0.580) 
 
 
 IsNBFI ns 1.246***    
(0.423) 
 
 
 NGO - -1.513**    
(0 .594) 
 
 
 IsNGO ns 0.295  
(0 .445) 
 
 
 Other  -2.045***   
(0.626) 
 
 
 Solidarity + 0.035   
(0.239) 
 
 
 LogGLP + -0.095*    
(0.053) 
 
 
 CPL - -0.002**   
(0) 
 
 Donations - -1.277**    
(0.583) 
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   LPSM + 0.002***    
(0.001) 
 
 
 LLR - 1.08**   
(0.533) 
 
 
 Female + -0.9572***   
(0 .340) 
 
 Iraq  0.675**    
(0.263) 
 
 
 Jordan  0.153 
(0.199) 
 
 
 Lebanon   -0.022  
(0.223) 
 
 
 Palestine  0.263  
(0.203) 
 
 
 Syria  -0.844***    
(0.294) 
 
 
 Yemen  -0.080    
(0.269) 
 
 
 Constant  4.166***    
(1.212) 
 
 
 Observations  79 
 
 
 R-squared  0.7806  
 *= significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% 
***=significant at 1% 
+ = positive impact on dependent variable 
- = negative impact on dependent variable 
ns = not significant 
blank = no strong expectation  
Source = Author’s calculations based on data rom the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
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6.1.1.2 Analyzing the Islamic Variable in the FSS Model  
As mentioned above, the binary variable indicating that a firm is Islamic is significant in the FSS 
model. The coefficient (β1 = –2.227) is negative for this variable, meaning that being an IMFI 
will decrease the FSS ratio. Specifically, being an IMFI structured as a bank has a negative effect 
on financial self-sufficiency.  
The coefficients β2, β3, β4, and β5 measure the effects of real yield (which reflects the 
interest rate or markup) and being Islamic on the effects of real yield on the FSS. The effect of 
the real yield on the FSS (β2) and the effect of squared real yield on the FSS (β4) are not 
statistically significant from zero, so cannot be said to impact the FSS according to this model. 
The effect of being an IMFI on the real yield’s effect on FSS (β3 = 18.706) is positive and 
significant, while the effect of being an IMFI on the squared real yield’s effect on FSS (β5 = -
44.011) is negative and significant. This means the overall effect of being an IMFI structured as 
a bank on the FSS is β1 + β3(RealYield) + β5(Yieldsq). This will produce an overall negative 
effect of being an IMFI structured as a bank on FSS, indicating that IMFIs structured as banks do 
not achieve financial self-sufficiency as well as conventional MFIs structured as banks.    
 The coefficients β7 and β8 measure the effect of being a NBFI on FSS and the effect of 
being Islamic on the FSS of a NBFI, respectively. The effect of being a conventional NBFI on 
FSS (β7 = -1.791) is negative and significant, while the effect of being an IMFI on the FSS of a 
conventional NBFI (β8 = 1.246) is positive and significant. Other things equal, the gross effect of 
being an Islamic NBFI will be β1 + β7 + β8. This produces an overall decrease in FSS for both 
conventional NBFIs (β7) and Islamic NBFIs (β1 + β7 + β8). The negative effect of the coefficients 
is larger for Islamic NBFIs than conventional NBFIs, suggesting Islamic NBFIs do worse overall 
in financial self-sufficiency than conventional NBFIs. When the effects of being an Islamic firm 
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on the real yield are considered [β3 (RealYield) + β5(Yieldsq)] with these findings, the overall 
effect remains negative on FSS for all values of real yield. 
 The coefficients β9 and β10 measure the effect of being a NGO on FSS and the effect of 
being Islamic on the FSS of a NGO, respectively. The effect of being a conventional NGO on 
FSS (β9 = -1.513) is negative and significant, while the effect of being an IMFI on the FSS of a 
NGO (β10) is not statistically significant. This means the overall effect of being an Islamic NGO 
on the FSS is β1 + β9, which produces an overall negative effect on the FSS. Both Islamic and 
conventional NGOs negatively impact FSS, with Islamic NGOs performing worse than 
conventional NGOs. When the effects of being an Islamic firm on the real yield are considered 
[β3 (RealYield) + β5(Yieldsq)] with these findings, the overall effect remains negative on FSS for 
all values of real yield.  
  This model indicates that for all institutional structures and values of real yield, Islamic 
microfinance firms have lower FSS values than their conventional counterparts, indicating that 
they are less financially self-sufficient. However, the mean of FSS ratios for IMFIs in this study 
is 1.602 and the median value is 1.2422, indicating that, at least for the firms in this dataset, 
IMFIs are still reaching financial self-sufficiency on average, just not as well as conventional 
firms. This is further supported by the spread of the data: at the 10th percentile, the FSS value is 
0.9957, and at the 25th percentile it is at 1.0541, indicating that 90% of the MFIs in this study are 
at least close to covering their costs and 75% are bringing in revenues that exceed their costs. In 
fact, only 4 Islamic firms in the sample are not achieving sufficient FSS scores. While the 
significant impact was unexpected and contradictory to the findings of Abdelkader and Salem 
(2013), which cite no significant difference in financial efficiency, this impact could possibly be 
attributed to factors such as different lending mechanisms or social services indicative of IMFIs 
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that are more expensive, resulting in higher costs and lower financial self-sufficiency, or to a 
difference in variables and methodology between this study and previous studies from which 
expectations were drawn. 
6.1.1.3 Significance of Variables in the ROA Model 
The only variable that significantly and positively affects the ROA in this model is the loans per 
staff member, which follows the original expectations. This indicates that an increase in the 
number of loans per staff member will result in a higher ROA, which is associated with better 
financial sustainability. 
 Three variables significantly and negatively impact the ROA. Following expectations, an 
increase in the percentage of a firm’s revenues that comes from donations has a negative impact 
on the MFI’s ROA. Contrary to expectations, an increase in the percentage of borrowers who are 
female has a negative and significant impact on ROA. Finally, being located in Syria also has a 
negative impact on the ROA. The negative impact of these variables on the ROA indicates that 
they have a negative effect on the financial sustainability of MFIs in this model.  
 Twenty variables in this regression are statistically insignificant and do not have an 
impact on the ROA of the firm. Following expectations, being an Islamic MFI, the effect of 
being an Islamic MFI on both NGOs and NBFIs, and the effect of being an Islamic firm on the 
real yield and squared real yield are all insignificant in affecting the ROA. Contrary to 
expectations, the real yield, the squared real yield, the MFI’s age, being a NBFI or a NGO, the 
percentage of loans offered as solidarity loans, the log of the GLP, and the LLR also are all 
statistically insignificant. Finally, being an “other” firm and being located in Iraq, Jordan, 
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Lebanon, Palestine, or Yemen likewise do not have a significant impact on the ROA in this 
study.   
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Table 6: Return on Assets Regression 
 Variable Name Expected Sign Coefficients  
 Islamic ns -0.233  
(0.154) 
 
 RealYield + 0.331  
(0.511) 
 
 
 RYIslamic ns 1.869  
(1.405) 
 
 
 Yieldsq - 0.446  
(0.991) 
 
 
 RY2Islamic ns -4.816    
(3.527) 
 
 
 LogAge + 0.002 
(0 .0211) 
 
 
 NBFI - -0.155  
(0.097) 
 
 
 IsNBFI ns 0.129    
(0.081) 
 
 
 NGO - -0.101    
(0.096) 
 
 
 IsNGO ns 0.061  
(0.073) 
 
 
 Other  -0.315 
(0.110) 
 
 
 Solidarity + 0.010    
(0.056) 
 
 
 LogGLP + 0.003 
(0.013) 
 
 
 CPL - 0 
(0) 
 
 
 Donations - -0.282**    
(0.137) 
 
 
 LPSM + 0.0003*    
(0.0002) 
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 LLR - 0.026 
(0.124) 
 
 
 Female + -0.204**     
(0.079) 
 
 
 Iraq  -0.003     
(0.062) 
 
 
 Jordan  0.060  
(0.048) 
 
 
 Lebanon   -0.023 
(0.054) 
 
 
 Palestine  0.063   
(0.048) 
 
 
 Syria  -0.408***   
(0.069) 
 
 
 Yemen  0.066   
(0.064) 
 
 
 Constant  0.073    
(0.283) 
 
 
 Observations  78 
 
 
 R-squared  0.8337  
 *= significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% 
***=significant at 1% 
+ = positive impact on dependent variable 
- = negative impact on dependent variable 
ns = not significant 
blank = no strong expectation  
Source = Author’s calculations based on data rom the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
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6.1.1.4 Analyzing the Islamic Variable in the ROA Model 
None of the variables used in this model to test the effects of being an Islamic firm were 
significant in the ROA regression. The lack of statistical significance for any variable related to 
the Islamic character of the MFI suggests, in line with expectations, that for this model, being an 
IMFI does not have a significant effect on the firm’s return on assets.  
 The insignificance of being Islamic in determining the ROA taken in consideration with 
the mean of the FSS values for IMFIs being above the minimum necessary to achieve financial 
self-sufficiency indicate that Islamic microfinance, at least in the MENA region, is a financially 
viable alternative for conventional microfinance. 
6.2 Outreach Models 
 As discussed previously, the dependent variables used to indicate outreach performance are the 
percent female borrowers and the ABB/GNI per capita. Higher values for the percentage of loans 
extended to women and lower values for the ABB/GNI per capita, indicating loan size, are 
associated with better outreach. The independent variables in this model represent the Islamic 
nature of the firm, the firm’s age, its institutional structure, its size, the monetary and personnel 
costs of its loans, loan defaults, the percentage of rurally based borrowers, the type of lending, 
the firm’s yields, its donations, the financial self-sufficiency, and the host country. Interactions 
between the sharia-compliant nature of the firm and its institution type are also included to 
portray a more accurate sense of whether the effects of being an Islamic firm are consistent 
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across the various institution types. In variables where a binary is included, the variables’ effects 
on the percent female borrowers and the average balance per borrower/GNI per capita are 
relative to a conventional, Egyptian MFI structured as a bank. The equations for percentage of 
borrowers who are female (equation 3) and ABB/GNI per capita (equation 4) for the OLS 
regressions follow:  
Equation 3. Female = β0+ β1Islamic + β2LogAge + β3NBFI + β4IsNBFI + β5NGO + 
β6IsNGO + β7Other + β8LogGLP + β9CPL + β10LPSM + β11LLR+ β12Rural+ 
β13Solidarity + β14RealYield + β15Yieldsq + β16Donations + β17FSS + β18Iraq + β19Jordan 
+ β20Lebanon + β21Palestine + β22Syria + β23Yemen 
 
Equation 4. ABBGNI = β0+ β1Islamic + β2LogAge + β3NBFI + β4IsNBFI + β5NGO + 
β6IsNGO + β7Other + β8LogGLP + β9CPL + β10LPSM + β11LLR+ β12Rural+ 
β13Solidarity + β14RealYield + β15Yieldsq + β16Donations + β17FSS + β18Iraq + β19Jordan 
+ β20Lebanon + β21Palestine + β22Syria + β23Yemen 
6.2.1 Regression Analysis for Percent Female and ABB/GNI Per Capita 
The model testing the effects of the independent variables on the average balance per 
borrower/GNI per capita has a higher R-squared value (90.40%) than the model testing the 
independent variables on the percentage of borrowers that are female (87.69%). This means that 
the variables account for a higher percentage of the variation of the ABB/GNI per capita model 
than of the percent female model.  A summary of the regression output can be found in table 7 
for the percent female borrowers and table 8 for the ABB/GNI per capita.  
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6.2.1.1 Significance of the Variables in the Percent Female Model 
Three variables have significant and positive effects on the percentage of borrowers who are 
female. As the original expectations assumed, an increase in the percentage of loans that are 
solidarity loans has a positive impact on the percent female borrower indicator. However, 
contrary to the expectations, the interaction between being a NGO and Islamic also has a positive 
effect on the indicator. Likewise, being located in Jordan results in positive effects on the percent 
female borrowers in this model. The positive effect of these variables on the percentage of 
borrowers who are female indicates that they have a positive impact on the outreach of the MFI 
as measured by outreach to women in this model.    
 Five variables have negative and significant impacts on the percentage of borrowers who 
are female. Conflicting with original predictions, and increase in the GLP, CPL, and better 
values of FSS negatively impact the percentage of borrowers who are female in this model.  
Additionally, being an “other” firm and being located in Iraq also result in lower percentages of 
borrowers who are women. The negative impact of these variables on the percentage of 
borrowers who are female indicates that they have a negative effect on the outreach of MFIs in 
this in this model.  
 Fifteen variables do not significantly impact the percentage of borrowers who are female 
in this model. As per expectations, being an Islamic firm, the effect of being an Islamic firm on 
the percentage of female borrowers for a NBFI, and increases in the LPSM and LLR have no 
significant impact on the MFI’s percentage of borrowers who are female. Being a NGO or a 
NBFI, the firm’s age, the percentage of borrowers who live rurally, the real yield, the squared 
real yield, the proportion of the firm’s revenue that comes from donations, and being located in 
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, or Yemen are also not statistically significant in this model.   
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      Table 7: Percent Female Borrowers Regression  
       Variable Name Expected Sign  Coefficients  
       Islamic ns -0.153    
(0.168) 
 
 
       LogAge  0.018 
(0.038) 
 
 
       NBFI + -0.289    
(0.214) 
 
 
       IsNBFI ns 0.185    
(0.164) 
 
 
       NGO + -0.334  
(0.207) 
 
 
       IsNGO ns 0.265* 
(0.159) 
 
 
       Other  -0.620***     
(0.222) 
 
 
       LogGLP ns -0.046**   
(0.022) 
 
 
       CPL ns -0.001***    
(0.0002) 
 
 
       LPSM ns 0  
(0) 
 
 
       LLR ns 0.139   
(0.213) 
 
 
       Rural + 0.078   
(0.077) 
 
 
       Solidarity + 0.310***    
(0.080) 
 
 
       RealYield  0.898  
(0.782) 
 
 
       Yieldsq  -0.484  
(1.595) 
 
 
       Donations + -0.023     
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(0.241) 
 
       FSS ns -0.111**    
(0.049) 
 
 
       Iraq  -0.263**    
(0.108) 
 
 
       Jordan  0.124*    
(0.071) 
 
 
       Lebanon   -0.055    
(0.084) 
 
 
       Palestine  0.127    
(0.077) 
 
 
       Syria  -0.101 
(0.118) 
 
 
       Yemen  0.029  
(0.099) 
 
 
       Constant  1.540***    
(0.432) 
 
 
       Observations  75 
 
 
       R-squared  0.8769  
      *= significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% 
***=significant at 1% 
+ = positive impact on dependent variable 
- = negative impact on dependent variable 
ns = not significant, blank = no strong expectation  
Source = Author’s calculations based on data rom the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) 
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 6.2.1.2 Analyzing the Islamic Variable in the Percent Female Borrowers Model 
The variable Islamic (β1) is insignificant in this model.  This implies that there is not a significant 
difference in the percentage of borrowers who are females between IMFIs structured as banks 
and conventional MFIs structured as banks.  
 In this model, the effect of being a NBFI on perfect female borrowers (β3) and the effect 
of being an IMFI of the percent female borrowers of a NBFI (β4) are insignificant. The total 
effect of being an IMFI structured as a NBFI on the percent female borrowers is measured by β1 
+ β3 + β4, Since all three are insignificant, this model implies that there is no significant 
difference among the effects of NBFIs, Islamic NBFIs, banks, and Islamic banks on the 
percentage of borrowers who are female.  
 The effect of being a NGO on the percent female borrowers (β5) is insignificant. 
However, the effect of being an IMFI on being a NGO’s effect on the percent female borrowers  
(β6) is positive and significant. The total effect of being an Islamic NGO is measured by β1 + β5 + 
β6, Only β6 is significantly different from zero, so this suggests that, while being a NGO does not 
produce a significantly different effect on the percentage of borrowers who are female, being an 
Islamic NGO does produce a significant increase in the percentage of borrowers who are female.  
 This model suggests overall that being an Islamic firm does not produce significantly 
different percentages of loans extended to women, save for a small but significant increase for 
Islamic NGOs. This difference, while unexpected, might be attributed to the nature of NGOs in 
general, which tend to focus more on their social mission than other institution types. It could be 
possible that the religious character of the firm creates an added commitment to the NGO’s 
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social mission, resulting in better outreach as measured by percentage of borrowers who are 
female. However, overall, the hypothesis holds true and we can assume that this model 
concludes that there is not a major difference in outreach between Islamic and conventional 
MFIs in the MENA region as measured by the percentage of borrowers who are women.  
6.2.1.3 Significance of the Variables in the ABB/GNI per capita Model 
Eight variables have positive and significant impacts on the ABB/GNI per capita of MFIs in this 
model. As expected, increases in the size of the firm as measured by the log of the GLP and the 
squared real yield have positive impacts on the ABB/GNI per capita. Contrary to the original 
expectations, being an IMFI, being a NBFI or NGO, and increases in the CPL also have positive 
impacts on the ABB/GNI per capita. Being an “other” MFI and being located in Palestine 
likewise positively impact the ABB/GNI per capita. A higher value of ABB/GNI per capita 
means a larger loan size. Therefore, the positive impact of these variables on the ABB/GNI per 
capita value indicates poorer outreach performance for MFIs in this model.  
Four variables in this model have negative, statistically significant impacts on the 
ABB/GNI per capita indicator. In line with the expected results, an increase in the percentage of 
borrowers who are rurally located and higher values of real yield result in lower values for 
ABB/GNI per capita. In contradiction to the original expectations, the effect of being an IMFI on 
the ABB/GNI per capita of a NGO has a significant and negative impact on the ABB/GNI per 
capita. Being located in Lebanon also has a negative impact on the ABB/GNI per capita. The 
negative effect of these variables on the ABB/GNI per capita indicate smaller loan sizes, and 
thus better outreach performance for MFIs in this model.  
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Ten variables in this model are not statistically significant in affecting the ABB/GNI per 
capita. As expected, the effect of being an IMFI on the ABB/GNI per capita of a NBFI is not 
statistically significant. The firm’s age, LPSM, LLR, percentage of loans distributed as solidarity 
loans, percentage of revenues that are donations, the FSS, and being located in Iraq, Jordan, 
Syria, or Yemen are also insignificant in determining loan size in this study.   
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Table 8: ABB/GNI per capita Regression 
        Variable Name Expected Sign  Coefficients  
        Islamic ns   0.742***    
(0.220) 
 
 
        LogAge  -0.006  
(0.050) 
 
 
        NBFI - 0.897*** 
(0.282) 
 
 
        IsNBFI ns -0.288    
(0.215) 
 
 
        NGO - 0.908***    
(0.272) 
 
 
        IsNGO ns -0.688 
(0.209)*** 
 
 
        Other  0.544*    
(0.291) 
 
 
        LogGLP + 0.074**    
(0.028) 
 
 
        CPL - 0.001***    
(0.0002) 
 
 
        LPSM + -0.0007*    
(0.0004) 
 
 
        LLR  -0.276 
(0.280) 
 
 
        Rural - -0.505***    
(0.101) 
 
 
        Solidarity - -0.0937 
(0.105) 
 
 
        RealYield - -3.455***    
(1.027) 
 
 
        Yieldsq + 4.814**      
(2.095) 
 
 
        Donations - 0.031     
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(0.316) 
 
        FSS + 0.081  
(0.065) 
 
 
        Iraq  -0.106  
(0.142) 
 
 
        Jordan  -0.003    
(0.093) 
 
 
        Lebanon  -0.423***    
(0.110) 
 
 
        Palestine  0.378***    
(0.101) 
 
 
        Syria  0.044  
(0.155) 
 
 
        Yemen  0.040 
(0.130) 
 
 
        Constant  -1.289**    
(0.567) 
 
 
        Observations  75 
 
 
        R-squared  0.9040  
        *= significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% 
***=significant at 1% 
+ = positive impact on dependent variable 
- = negative impact on dependent variable ns = not significant, blank = no strong expectation  
Source = Author’s calculations based on data rom the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
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 6.2.1.4 Analyzing the Islamic Variable in the Average Balance Per Borrower/GNI Per Capita 
Model 
The variable Islamic is positive and significant in this model. The coefficient for this variable (β1 
= 0.742) implies that IMFIs have higher ABB/GNI per capita than conventional banks, or that 
their average loan sizes are higher. This typically indicates poorer outreach. 
The effect of being a NBFI (β3 = 0.897) on ABB/GNI per capita is positive and 
significant. This means that being a NBFI increases the ABB/GNI per capita as compared to a 
conventional microfinance bank, implying that NBFIs have larger loan sizes than conventional 
microfinance banks. The effect of being an IMFI on the NBFI’s ABB/GNI per capita (β4) is 
insignificant. The total effect of being an Islamic NBFI on ABB/GNI per capita is β1 + β3 + β4. 
As only β1 and β3 are significantly different from zero and both are positive, the overall effect of 
being an Islamic NBFI on ABB/GNI per capita is positive, indicating larger loan sizes and 
weaker outreach.  
The effect of being a NGO (β5 = 0.908) on ABB/GNI per capita is positive and 
significant. Therefore, this model implies that being a NGO tends to be associated with larger 
loan sizes and weaker outreach. When the effect of being an IMFI on a NGO’s ABB/GNI per 
capita is considered (β6 = -0.688), the result is negative and significant. The total effect of being 
an Islamic NGO on the ABB/GNI per capita as compared to a conventional microfinance bank is 
measured by β1 + β5 + β6 and produces an overall positive effect which is only slightly larger than 
the effect of being a conventional NGO (β5). This means that the model suggests Islamic NGOs 
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typically have higher values for ABB/GNI per capita, indicating that Islamic NGOs might extend 
slightly larger loans than other institutions and perform worse in outreach to the poor.   
This model suggests overall that being an Islamic firm is associated with lower levels of 
outreach as measured by higher ABB/GNI per capita due to the higher values for ABB/GNI per 
capita that Islamic firms have compared to their counterparts. These results differ from the 
conclusions of Ahmed (2002), which claims that IMFIs tend to extend smaller loans, but are 
confirmed for this data set after further exploration of the means, medians, and spreads of the 
subsets for Islamic and conventional MFIs. While this result was contrary to the literature and to 
expectations, the higher expenses that IMFIs face and their need to cover those costs, which 
could result in larger loans, might explain this result. This outcome, in conjunction with the 
results on outreach as measured by percentage of borrowers who are female, does not preclude 
Islamic microfinance as a viable alternative in terms of outreach, but instead highlights that 
Islamic microfinance is competitive in outreach to women and underscores an area where 
Islamic MFIs are not as competitive, outreach to the poor as measured by smaller loan sizes, and 
thus must improve in order to stay true to the ideals upon which Islamic microfinance is 
supposed to be built.  
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7.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study is to identify whether Islamic microfinance institutions perform 
competitively with conventional microfinance institutions in key performance indicators of 
financial sustainability and outreach. As increasing access to financial inclusion and 
microfinance remain important to the development agenda, answering these questions can help 
determine if Islamic microfinance is a practical alternative for offering financial services to the 
poor who prefer religiously compliant options.   
 The results of this study are mixed in the comparison of IMFIs to conventional MFIs in 
the financial sustainability and outreach indicators. The results for determining financial self-
sufficiency indicate that Islamic microfinance firms perform worse than conventional 
microfinance firms across all institutional structures. The mean value of FSS for IMFIs, 
however, indicated that they still achieve financial self-sufficiency on average. Additionally 
further breakdown of scores shows that at least 75% of IMFIs in this study are achieving the 
minimum value to be considered financially self-sufficient. There is no significant effect of being 
an IMFI on return on assets, indicating that the IMFIs aren’t performing worse than conventional 
MFIs. These results are comparable to the previous studies in that they indicate that Islamic 
microfinance is likely not performing better than conventional microfinance in financial 
sustainability, but that they are not doing poorly overall and are doing well enough to continue to 
be considered as a viable alternative.  
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 Greater ambiguity occurs in addressing the effect of being an IMFI on outreach 
performance. Overall, there is no significant difference between Islamic and conventional MFIs 
for the percentage of borrowers who are women, except for Islamic NGOS, which have a 
statistically significant, though small, positive effect. The effect of being an IMFI on the 
ABB/GNI per capita is positive and statistically significant. This means that IMFIs tend to 
distribute larger loans, suggesting they reach less poor borrowers. These results suggest overall 
that Islamic firms are statistically doing as well in reaching female borrowers, but do not achieve 
outreach as well when measured by loan size, leaving the overall differences in outreach between 
Islamic and conventional firms inconclusive.  
 Notable complications and limitations emerged in this study. Primary among the 
complications is that the data available for firms in the MENA region are limited and often 
incomplete. Information on a greater number of firms and more thorough and accurate 
monitoring and reporting from these firms are crucial for further study. A significant limitation 
of the study is the sample size of the study, so a study involving a larger number of conventional 
and Islamic firms could lead to more conclusive results. A second limitation is the focus on the 
MENA region. The results present an indication on how IMFIs are performing in this region and 
can be used for reference and comparison when exploring other regions, but cannot be 
extrapolated to explain trends across different regions or worldwide.    
 These complications and findings present several conclusions. Primarily, at the very least, 
Islamic microfinance firms are doing well enough to continue to be considered as viable 
alternatives to conventional firms, especially if this means providing access to financial services 
to the poor who will not partake in the conventional financial system for religious reasons. At the 
very least, the findings and complications in this study offer indications of areas that IMFIs can 
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focus on improving. The results of this study do not contradict the previous studies, but add 
another layer of context to their findings that opens the door for more questions regarding 
Islamic microfinance to be explored and expanded on.  
 Based on these conclusions, further exploration and research on Islamic microfinance is 
essential to creating a better understanding of its benefits and drawbacks. While this study 
reflects on how Islamic microfinance performs in the Arab world, more diverse analyses will 
contribute to an informed debate regarding Islamic microfinance as an alternative to 
conventional microfinance and the role of Islamic microfinance in improving financial inclusion. 
Employing different methods and models of analyzing the effects of Islamic microfinance would 
provide a more robust perspective. For example, global and regional assessments of its viability 
are essential for drawing broad conclusions and offering suggestions to these questions that are 
not MENA-specific. As the argument of the Islamic financial system being more socially just 
than the conventional system emerges in the literature, qualitative studies of a broad range of 
Islamic firms could offer tangible data in analyzing this claim and comparing the ideal vision of 
the Islamic financial system with the reality on the ground. Finally, as microfinance is 
increasingly questioned as an effective and favorable form of alleviating poverty, impact studies 
on how involvement in Islamic microfinance has benefited and hurt participants and 
communities are essential in determining the future of Islamic microfinance.  
  This study began with the question of whether Islamic microfinance is a viable 
alternative to conventional microfinance. The results of the regression analysis in this study, 
corroborated by previous studies, indicate that it is, at least in the MENA region. Providing 
financial access to the poor helps overcome discrimination in financial markets and can play an 
important role in poverty alleviation, development, and broader economic prosperity. 
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Additionally, increasing equitable access to financial services through providing sharia-
compliant alternatives that address the religious needs of different individuals and communities 
could add to these benefits. As the debate on microfinance continues and the need for new and 
different ways to approach the problems associated with poverty remains strong, the role of 
Islamic microfinance in addressing economic discrimination and poverty more broadly should 
remain an option that is explored and evaluated.     
 
 85 
Bibliography 
Abdelkader, Ines Ben, and Asma Ben Salem. "Islamic vs Conventional Microfinance 
Institutions: Performance Analysis in MENA Countries." International Journal of 
Business and Social Research (IJBSR) 3.5 (2013): n. pag. Web. 
 
Ahmed, Habib. "FINANCING MICROENTERPRISES: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF 
ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS." Islamic Economic Studies 9.2 
(2002): n. pag. Print. 
 
Ahmed, Habib. Integrating Awqaf in the Islamic Financial Sector. N.p., 2007. Web. 9 Nov. 
2014. 
 
Ahmed, Habib. "Zakah, Awqaf, and Poverty Alleviation: Assessments, Policies, and Institutional 
Development." Role of Zakah and Awqaf in Poverty Alleviation. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 
Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, 2004. 109-32. 
Print. 
 
Armendariz, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch. The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 2005. Print. 
 
Asutay, Mehmet. "Conceptualising and Locating the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: 
Aspirations of Islamic Moral Economy vs the Realities of Islamic Finance." Asian and 
African Studies 11.2 (2012): 93-113. SSRN. Web. 15 Feb. 2015. 
 
Asutay, Mehmet. "An Introduction to Islamic Moral Economy and Reflecting on the Resilience 
of Islamic Finance Against the Financial Crisis." El Shaarani Centre for Islamic 
Finance and Business Inaugural Session. Birmingham. 15 Feb. 2015. 
 
Asutay, Mehmet. "Islamic Banking and Finance: Social Failure." New Horizon 169 (2008): n. 
pag. SSRN. Web. 
 
Atia, Mona. "Islamic Approaches to Development: A Case Study of Zakat, Sadaqa and Qurd Al 
Hassan in Contemporary Egypt." 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics 
and Finance (2011): n. pag. JSTOR. Web. 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia G. Kinnan. The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation. Working paper no. 18950. 
The National Bureau of Economic Research, Mar. 2014. Web. 12 Nov. 2014. 
 86 
 
Basu, Ranajoy, Diane Wood, Atif Hanif, Emmanuel Hadjidakis, Amar Meher, Salam Alsmadi, 
Jonathan Marshall, Chang C. Hoong, Oscar F. Tan, Christina Koh, and Afsha Karim. 
ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE REPORT. Rep. N.p.: INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW ORGANISATION, Allen & Overy LLP, 2009. Print. 
 
Bianchi, Robert R. "The Revolution in Islamic Finance." Chicago Journal of International Law 
7.2 (2007): 569-81. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
 
Costa, Valentia, Hala Makhlouf, and Perrine Mazaud. Women’s Empowerment through Islamic 
Microfinance in Egypt. Thesis. Centre for Economic and International Studies Tor 
Vergata, 2010. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print. 
 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. Financial Performance and 
Outreach: A Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks. Working paper no. 3827. N.p.: 
World Bank, 2006. Print. 
 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. Microfinance Meets the Market. 
Working paper no. 4630. N.p.: World Bank, 2008. Print. 
 
Cull, Robert, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Jonathan Morduch. Microfinance Tradeoffs: Regulation, 
Competition, and Financing. Working paper no. 5086. N.p.: World Bank, 2009. Print. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Aslı, and Patrick H. Beck. Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding 
Access. Rep. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2008. Print. 
 
Dusuki, Asyraf Wajdi. "Banking for the Poor: The Role of Islamic Banking in Microfinance 
Initiatives." Humanomics 24.1 (2008): 49-66. Web. 
 
El-Komi, Mohamed, and Rachel Croson. "Experiments in Islamic Microfinance." Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013): 252-69. JSTOR. Web. 9 Nov. 2014. 
 
El-Zoghbi, Mayada, and Michael Tarazi. Trends in Sharia-Compliant Financial Inclusion. 
Publication. Vol. 84. Washington D.C.: CGAP, 2013. Print. 
 
Freudenberg, Brett, and Mahmood Nathie. "Chasing Islamic Finance: A Framework to Assess 
the Potential Benefits of Australian Tax Reforms to Facilitate Islamic Finance." 
Review of Business 32.2 (2012): 58-71. Academic OneFile. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
 
Giné, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch. Microfinance Games∗ . 
Working paper no. 3959. N.p.: World Bank, 2006. Print. 
 
Global Islamic Financial Report 2013. Rep. EdBiz Consulting, 2013. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
<http://www.gifr.net/>. 
 
 87 
Goetz, Anne Marie, and Rina Sen Gupta. "Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control 
over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh." World Development 24.1 
(1996): 45-63. Print. 
 
Hailey, Paul. "Microfinance and Islamic Finance: Can They Be Reconciled and How Can They 
Benefit One Another?" Thesis. HEC Paris - MBA, 2009. Print. 
 
Hamoudi, Haider. "Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On From and Function in Islamic Finance." 
Chicago Journal of International Law (2007): n. pag. SSRN. Web. 15 Feb. 2015. 
 
Hamoudi, Haider. "The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of Realism in 
the Study of Islamic Law." The American Journal of Comparative Law (2008): n. pag. 
SSRN. Web. 15 Feb. 2015. 
 
Hourani, Husam. "The Three Principles of Islamic Finance Explained." International Financial 
Law Review 23.5 (2004): 46-47. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
 
International Fund for Agriculture Development. ￼Islamic Microfinance: Unlocking New 
Potential to Fight Rural Poverty. Rep. Rome, Italy: IFAD, 2012. Print. 
 
Iqbal, Munawar, and Mohamed Ariff. "Development, History, and Prospects of Islamic 
Banking." The Foundations of Islamic Banking. Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011. N. pag. 
Print. 
 
Karim, Nimrah, Michael Tarazi, and Xavier Reille. Islamic Microfinance: An Emerging Market 
Niche. Rep. no. 49. Washington D.C.: CGAP, 2008. Print. 
 
Karlan, Dean S. "Social Connections and Group Banking." The Economic Journal 117.517 
(2007): F52-84. Web. 
 
Ma’sum Billah, Mohd. "24. Islamic Banking and the Growth of Takaful." Handbook of Islamic 
Banking. By Kabir Hassan and Mervyn Lewis. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
N. pag. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
 
Mohieldin, Mahmoud, Zamir Iqbal, Ahmed Rostom, and Xiaochen Fu. The Role of Islamic 
Finance in Enhancing Financial Inclusion in Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) Countries. Working paper no. 5920. N.p.: World Bank, 2011. Print. 
 
Montgomery, Richard. "Disciplining or Protecting the Poor? Avoiding the Social Costs of Peer 
Pressure in Micro-credit Schemes." Journal of International Development 8.2 (1996): 
289-305. Print. 
 
Obaidullah, Mohammed, and Tariqullah Khan. ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT: 
Challenges and Initiatives. Policy Dialogue. Vol. 2. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, 2008. Print. 
 
 88 
Rahman, Aminur. "Microcredit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who 
Pays?" World Development 26.2 (1999): 67-82. Print. 
 
Rankin, Katherine N. "Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development." Feminist 
Economics 8.1 (2002): 1-24. Print. 
 
Robbins, Holly E. "Soul Searching and Profit Seeking Reconciling the Competing Goals of 
Islamic Finance." Texas Law Review 88.5 (2010): 1125-153. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. 
 
Sadique, Muhammad A. "Financing Micro and Medium Sized Enterprises through Decreasing 
Partnership (Musharakah Mutanaqisah): Refining Shariah and Banking Aspects for 
Enhanced Applicability." ISLAMIC FINANCE FOR MICRO AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISES. N.p.: Islamic Research & Training Institute-Islamic Development 
Bank, Centre for Islamic Banking and Finance and Management, Universiti Brunei 
Darussalam, 2008. 53-74. Print. 
 
Thomas, Duncan. "Intrahousehold Allocation: An Inferential Approach." Journal of Human 
Resources 25.4 (1990): 635-64. Print. 
 
"World: People and Society: Religions." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2010. Web. 30 Apr. 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/xx.html>. 
 89 
